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Abstract 
This Master's thesis focuses on European Union's accession conditionality in the 
Western Balkans countries in relation to their foreign policy alignment after the 
Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. More specifically, it 
analyses the alignment of current official and potential candidate states with sanctions 
on Russia. The alignment of enlargement countries is necessary for both the candidate 
countries if they intend to become members as well as for the EU itself as the former 
need to fully adopt all acquis and the latter needs to preserve its capability to “speak in a 
single voice” and continue promoting its values abroad. The main aim of the thesis is to 
ascertain whether EU's conditionality is credible for current enlargement countries. As 
foreign policy alignment is part of non-negotiable criteria for accession, the extent of 
alignment and the reasons why these states have aligned or not aligned with sanctions 
on Russia is analysed.  In doing so, the focus is on the normative basis of policy 
positions and the role of EU values in the statements of government representatives. 
The thesis firstly elaborates on the importance of enlargement, foreign policy alignment 
and norm transfer, and then moves on to analyse whether the EU puts pressure on 
candidate states to align, and how government officials publicly respond to this 
pressure. Secondly, the thesis moves on to analyse the substance of the explanations of 
Western Balkan government representatives and the possible variety of domestic actors 
who might be interested in promoting an alternative foreign policy agenda. Results 
show that most non-aligning Western Balkan states refuse to join sanctions due to their 
rational interests and/or close relations with Russia. Furthermore, there are also 
countries that already align, but have joined EU sanctions partly due to their own self-
interest. All in all, research shows that even though the EU is a union based on certain 
norms and values, there is little to prove that its norms have been internalised by 
enlargement countries. Therefore, if the intention would be to speed up the enlargement 
process and ensure future unity, more attention needs to be given to the normative basis 
of EU foreign policy. 
Keywords: EU enlargement, conditionality, Western Balkans, foreign policy, sanctions 
Table of contents 
 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 5 
1. Development of European Union accession criteria ................................................. 9 
2. Effecting change in enlargement countries ............................................................. 14 
2.1 EU membership conditionality and norm transfer ........................................... 16 
2.2 Importance of CFSP alignment ........................................................................ 20 
2.3 What influences CFSP alignment? ................................................................... 23 
3. Methodology ........................................................................................................... 26 
3.1 Case selection ................................................................................................... 26 
3.2 Operationalisation ............................................................................................ 28 
3.3 Limitations ........................................................................................................ 31 
4. Empirical analysis ................................................................................................... 33 
4.1 Alignment with EU CFSP and sanctions on Russia ......................................... 33 
4.2 EU sanctions on Russia and their perceived legitimacy ................................... 37 
4.3 Ethnic divisions and public support for EU membership ................................. 43 
4.4 Official foreign policy positions in the Western Balkans ................................ 47 
4.4.1 Serbia......................................................................................................... 47 
4.4.2 Montenegro ............................................................................................... 52 
4.4.3 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ................................................ 57 
4.4.4 Albania ...................................................................................................... 62 
4.4.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina ........................................................................... 64 
4.4.6 Kosovo ...................................................................................................... 68 
5. Comparison ............................................................................................................. 70 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 75 
References ....................................................................................................................... 78 
 
Introduction 
Enlargement is seen as the most successful part of European Union's foreign policy. In 
2012, the European Union (EU) received the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in promoting 
peace, stability, prosperity and democracy in the region. The joint statement by the 
European Commission and European Council presidents noted that “this Prize is the 
strongest possible recognition of the deep political motives behind our Union: the 
unique effort by ever more European states to overcome war and divisions and to jointly 
shape a continent of peace and prosperity.
1” While this prize was awarded in relation to 
the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds to Central and Eastern European countries, there 
are many other states in Europe which need support from the union in order to stabilise 
their domestic and regional politics. Therefore, being part of the Western value space 
and internalising norms that the EU is built upon is vital in ensuring a prosperous future 
for many neighbouring states, not least the Western Balkans that are next in line for EU 
membership. 
In 2017, the EU is still committed to enlargement policy and offers a credible 
membership perspective to six Western Balkan states, while reminding that progress in 
negotiations mainly depends on the “homework” done by candidate countries 
themselves. As the EU focuses on the successes and failures of a candidate's own 
domestic reform agenda, it also allows distancing itself when progress slows down. 
Furthermore, due to the limited absorption capacity and low public support for EU 
enlargement in current member states, the union is not actively demanding that 
candidate states align with all acquis as soon as possible, but rather when they are 
ready. While Turkey is also an official candidate state, the internal developments in 
2016 and 2017 have limited its perspective to continue integration into European 
structures and value space. Therefore, due to the setbacks in Turkey this thesis focuses 
on the six official and potential candidate states in the Western Balkans that have all 
voiced their intention to become member states and their willingness to align with 
policies in order to achieve membership as soon as possible. 
                                                 
1
 'Joint statement of José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, and Herman Van 
Rompuy, President of the European Council on the award of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the EU', 
European Commission, 12 October 2012 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-779_en.htm> 
[accessed 9 May 2017] 
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As the criteria for membership are extensive and it is not possible to compare and 
contrast all aspects of the enlargement policy, this thesis focuses on Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), i.e. Chapter 31 of the acquis. The relevant membership 
conditions set by the EU designate that candidate states are expected to progressively 
align with its foreign policy declarations, decisions and positions during the negotiation 
process, and fully align with all aspects of the CFSP, including restrictive measures, 
before they would join the European Union. While this thesis demonstrates that foreign 
policy alignment was not a problem before the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, alignment has 
visibly decreased in some states. In general, half of the Western Balkan official or 
potential candidate states are not willing to align with EU CFSP in relation to sanctions 
against Russia which were put in place in 2014, and this could develop into an 
important obstacle on their integration paths. 
Since the European Union intends to continue with enlargement policy and direct 
reforms in these six Western Balkan states with the aim of stabilising the continent like 
it did with the CEE enlargement round, it needs to ensure its conditionality is credible 
for candidate states. If the Western Balkan states interpret the lack of pressure from the 
EU as an indication that their national interest could influence the unity of the EU 
foreign policy and in certain circumstances their non-alignment would be acceptable, 
there is little hope to “speak in a single voice” in EU foreign policy in the future. In 
addition, non-alignment would give the current EU countries a legitimate reason not to 
accept further enlargement in the near future or postpone it indefinitely. 
This Master's thesis aims to analyse why some Western Balkan countries have chosen 
to fully align with EU CFSP and some have not. As alignment requires that candidate 
states are able to put their individual economic and other interests aside in order to show 
solidarity with the EU, their priorities and values are mirrored in the decision to align 
with CFSP. Analysing the reasons behind foreign policy choices is particularly 
important as it enables to understand whether candidates see EU conditionality as 
credible and whether their reasons for not aligning could be altered by pressure from the 
EU. Therefore, comparing these explanations allows understanding whether compliance 
is genuine or if it might be imposed on the candidate states. Imposed compliance, 
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however, could result in volatile alignment or non-alignment in issues where the policy 
positions of candidate states are a misfit with current EU positions. 
The thesis also includes a comparison of the ethnic composition of each state and 
general public support for EU membership as these divisions are seen as the main 
dividing lines among the Western Balkan populations, and therefore also of their 
political representatives. Ethnicity continues to be an important factor that the political 
structure in these societies is based on first and foremost due to ethnic conflicts many of 
these countries survived after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Including this factor is 
important as it increases our knowledge of the presence of domestic actors who might 
not agree with the foreign policy agenda of the current governments and might be 
interested in pushing for an alternative approach. Possible agenda shifts may take place 
both in countries that already align with EU CFSP as well as in countries that have 
refused to align with EU policy when it comes to restrictive measures against Russia. 
What concerns the aims of the union, it is necessary to understand whether EU high 
officials need to give more attention to the Western Balkan countries where domestic 
actors might seek policy shifts. 
Several authors have written about the long-lasting effects of norms and more 
specifically, they have argued that the EU should focus on changing the values and 
norms in a society as norms are more effective in the long term.
2
 While it is possible to 
agree to this theory in principle, it needs to be studied whether this process of norm 
transfer is actually taking place in the Western Balkans. The EU's foreign policy agenda 
which is generally based on norms and values is one of the most telling policy areas in 
order to test this theory. Therefore, this thesis presents the current progress of the EU in 
transferring its norms in foreign policy to the agendas of its candidate states that should 
be the most interested in aligning with EU policies due to their intention of joining the 
union. 
The research question this thesis aims to answer is: which factors influence CFSP 
alignment in the Western Balkan countries concerning Russia-related foreign policy 
positions? While it would be effective in the long term if the candidate states understand 
                                                 
2
 Nikola Tomić, 'When the carrot is not sweet enough. Conditionality versus norms as modes of EU 
influence on Serbia's foreign policy', Südosteuropäische Hefte, 2.1, (2013), 77-106 
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and internalise the values and norms respected by current EU member states, it is not 
clear whether the union has managed to explain to its candidates that these norms are 
not negotiable and full alignment is mandatory. In order to answer the research 
question, the thesis will include a country-specific analysis of the statements of Western 
Balkan countries' governments in relation to EU sanctions against Russia. Data is 
collected from both official government websites as well as media outlets in order to 
analyse the links between the official position to align or not to align and the underlying 
reasons why policy change would be too costly for certain countries in the region. 
The first chapter of the thesis focuses on explaining the change in accession 
conditionality in order to better understand why full alignment is necessary. In addition, 
it is also explained why the EU is still committed to the Western Balkan enlargement, 
why this is vital for the region and why has this part of Europe received more attention 
recently. The second chapter gives an overview of how EU enlargement has been 
studied and what are the developments in this field of research. Furthermore, the chapter 
explains the different approaches how to induce change in candidate states, including 
through conditionality which often focuses on rational cost-benefit calculation, as well 
as socialisation and norms transfer which are seen as vital for producing truly long-
lasting and genuine alignment. The third chapter focuses on the method used in this 
thesis to answer the research question and test the hypotheses, as well as describes the 
limitations using this method and data produces. The fourth chapter presents the 
alignment records of current potential and official candidate states, an analysis of the 
pressure from EU high officials to align and the overall legitimacy of EU conditions and 
the ethnic composition and public support for EU membership. The chapter then 
presents a country-specific analysis of the explanations for alignment and non-
alignment. The last chapter of this thesis compares the six countries in question, and is 
followed by concluding remarks from the author. 
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1. Development of European Union accession criteria 
Conditionality has become an inseparable part of cooperating with the European Union 
as an organisation built on respecting certain norms and values would not seem 
legitimate if it ignored these values in its external relations. Therefore, conditionality is 
an important part of both agreements with enlargement countries are well as with other 
third states. Even though conditions vary across countries and types of agreements, 
there is a clear tendency from the EU to set stricter and more ambitious cooperation 
terms over time and where needed. The most all-encompassing conditions are set to 
potential member states of the European Union. While the precursors of the European 
Union, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) indicated that potential members could only be those countries that 
are European: “any European State may request to accede to the present Treaty,3” the 
terms are certainly not that modest anymore. The conditions of membership have 
developed into a collection of remarkably detailed requirements that need to be fulfilled 
before a country can even start its accession negotiations. 
While it is true that the condition of being “European” ruled out membership for many, 
it still left the door open for most countries in the region which realised the benefits of 
cross-border cooperation and aspired to join the union. After successive enlargement 
rounds that took place every following decade from the creation of the EU, the territory 
of the union had spread out to Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and as a 
result raised hopes in additional countries that indicated their wish to become possible 
candidates. Therefore, every enlargement round brought the EU's borders closer to more 
countries in the region, but in parallel the EU also included more conditions which 
needed to be fulfilled before membership was possible or to be even considered. 
The European Union started applying political conditions to third states mainly in the 
end of 1980s with the fourth Lomé Convention (1989) which linked development aid 
with human rights, rule of law and democracy. When these norms and values were not 
respected to a sufficient extent, the EU threatened to recommend restrictive measures 
                                                 
3
 Art. 98, Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 11951K/TXT, EUR-Lex, 1951; 
Art. 237, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 11957E/TXT, EUR-Lex, 1957 
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(notably suspending aid).
4
 In 1992, the EU included the promotion of its values in the 
common provisions of the Maastricht Treaty which established the political union now 
known as the European Union. The provisions stated that in relation to development 
cooperation the “community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective 
of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
5” What concerns candidate states, a year later, 
during the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, the Copenhagen criteria were put in 
place in order to raise clarity concerning what EU membership is about and who would 
be eligible to join. The criteria established conditions which candidate states must 
conform to and the following principles are still guiding the union's enlargement policy: 
1. stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities; 
2. a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the EU; 
3. ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to 
effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of 
EU law (the 'acquis'), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union.
6
 
These conditions have a dual purpose. While they serve the interests of the current 
member states by ensuring that new members would not obstruct the ongoing 
integration process (i.e. ensure EU absorption capacity is taken into account), these 
conditions also act as guidelines for aspiring members on their reform paths.
7
 The 
Treaty of Amsterdam which came into force in 1999 further confirmed norms that the 
EU is founded upon: “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles 
which are common to the Member states.
8” With the Lisbon Treaty, member states not 
                                                 
4
 Véronique Dimier, 'Constructing Conditionality: The Bureaucratization of Development Aid', European 
Foreign Affairs Review, 11.2, (2006), 263-280 
5
 Art. 130u, Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191, EUR-Lex, 1992 
6
 Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria), EUR-Lex <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague.html> [accessed 22 January 2017] 
7
 Heather Grabbe, 'European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire', International 
Political Science Review, 23.3, (2002), 249-268 (p. 252) 
8
 Art. 6, Treaty of Amsterdam, OJ C 340, EUR-Lex, 1997 
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only reaffirmed their commitment to upholding these norms and values set in the 
treaties, but conditioned any candidate state to actively promote them: “any European 
State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting 
them may apply to become a member of the Union.
9” Thus, the EU expects its member 
states to actively export these values and in doing so become active supporters and 
developers of EU foreign policy. 
Even though the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains in the exclusive 
competence of the member states, the Lisbon Treaty indicates that “Member States shall 
support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of 
loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area.
10” 
These actions include the general guidelines as well as decisions, actions and positions 
taken by the union.
11
 Furthermore, member states are asked to “ensure, through the 
convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on 
the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.
12” Whereas all 
these articles refer to countries that are already members of the European Union, it 
needs to be taken into account that it would speak in favour of the candidate states if 
they show solidarity even before they are able to join the EU. If and when a candidate 
state does not align with CFSP, the accession process will most likely be postponed 
until commitment to EU norms and values is displayed. What is more, as the accession 
process advances, candidates are expected to show commitment to promote EU values 
outside their borders as well if they wish to move forward with integration. 
The EU's commitment to continue with its enlargement policy in the Balkans was 
confirmed during the 2000 European Council meeting in Feira, Portugal when member 
states adopted Presidency conclusions. These conclusions also stated that 
“its [EC's] objective remains the fullest possible integration of the 
countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream 
of Europe through the Stabilisation and Association process, 
political dialogue, liberalisation of trade and cooperation in Justice 
                                                 
9
 Art. 49, Treaty on European union (Consolidated version 2016), OJ C 202, EUR-Lex, 2016 
10
 Art. 24, Treaty on European union (Consolidated version 2016), OJ C 202, EUR-Lex, 2016 
11
 Art. 25, Treaty on European union (Consolidated version 2016), OJ C 202, EUR-Lex, 2016 
12
 Art. 32, Treaty on European union (Consolidated version 2016), OJ C 202, EUR-Lex, 2016 
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and Home Affairs. All the countries concerned are potential 
candidates for EU membership.
13” 
Following the European Council meeting in Feira, the first EU – Western Balkans 
Summit was held in Zagreb at the end of the year. During this summit, EU reaffirmed 
its commitment and declared it would continue supporting the Western Balkan states in 
their individual paths towards democratic institutions, reforms, good neighbourly 
relations and cooperation.
14
 The next meeting that took place jointly with the Western 
Balkan (WB) states was held in Thessaloniki in 2003 and is seen as one of the most 
important summits for the then potential candidate states as 'the Thessaloniki agenda for 
the Western Balkans: Moving towards European Integration' was adopted. This 
document laid out more clearly the methods the EU intends use to support these 
countries' European integration (including by financial means) and it also set priority 
fields where each aspiring member state needed to reform. What is more, the 2003 
Thessaloniki Summit declaration did not just include political support for democratic 
and economic reforms, but envisaged possible future membership that would require 
cooperating in other policy fields as well. The potential candidate states also agreed to 
enhance cooperation in the EU's CFSP area: 
“The Western Balkan countries welcome the decisions by the EU to 
strengthen its Stabilisation and Association policy towards the 
region and to enrich it with elements from the experience of 
enlargement. They welcome in particular the launching of the 
European Partnerships, as well as the decisions for enhanced co-
operation in the areas of political dialogue and the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, parliamentary co-operation, support for 
institution building, opening of Community programmes.
15” 
                                                 
13
 Santa Maria da Feira European Council Conclusions of the Presidency, European Parliament, 19-20 
June 2000 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm> [accessed 27 April 2017] 
14
 Zagreb Summit Declaration, European Commission, 24 November 2000 
<http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/ZagrebSummit24Nov2000.pdf> [accessed 27 April 2017] 
15
 EU-Western Balkans Summit, European Commission, 21 June 2003 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_PRES-03-163_en.htm> [accessed 27 April 2017] 
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The following years saw EU's commitment being confirmed numerous times while the 
European Commission negotiated and concluded SAAs with the enlargement states in 
the region. Despite these efforts, however, the success rate in the Western Balkan states 
remained visibly different in comparison. Croatia was the first country in the region that 
managed to align its policies with the EU and fulfil the accession criteria to become a 
member state in 2013, raising hopes in other states as well. However, others have been 
much slower in aligning with EU policies. 
Currently, the EU has brought the Western Balkans firmly back on the agenda of the 
union. During the celebration of 60
 
years from the signing of the Rome Treaty, member 
states of the EU confirmed in the Rome Declaration that the union is still committed to 
enlargement: “We want a Union which remains open to those European countries that 
respect our values and are committed to promoting them.
16” This declaration was 
complemented by high level visits to the WB countries, including the visit of High 
Representative Mogherini in March when she met with leaders from all six countries. 
Ahead of the visits she confirmed that “the European Union will not be complete as 
long as this region at the heart of Europe is not united, as part of our community.
17” 
What concerns foreign policy, however, there are candidate states and potential 
candidates that have aligned with CFSP for years, but there are also countries where 
alignment has decreased. The alignment record which started to decrease in some 
Western Balkan countries from 2014 is closely tied with the Ukrainian crisis and the 
annexation of Crimea. Following these events, some enlargement countries opted to 
show support to Ukraine and the EU, but some insisted on military neutrality and/or 
made their case by claiming to suffer remarkable negative economic consequences or 
disadvantages in other bilateral issues if they would be forced to align. Generally, even 
though the Western Balkan countries confirm that their long-term policy goal is to join 
the EU, not all are ready to choose between the EU and Russia when it comes to foreign 
policy. Instead, they prefer maintaining sufficiently good relations with both. 
                                                 
16
 The Rome Declaration, European Council, 25 March 2017 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration> [accessed 24 
April 2017] 
17
 Federica Mogherini, 'Leading the Western Balkans inside the European Union', European External 
Action Service, 1 March 2017 <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage_en/21705/%22Leading%20the%20Western%20Balkans%20inside%20the%20European%20U
nion%22%20Federica%20Mogherini> [accessed 6 May 2017] 
14 
 
2. Effecting change in enlargement countries 
Large part of the literature on EU enlargement in the Western Balkans focuses on the 
reasons why the current enlargement strategy does not work in this region the same way 
it did in CEE (see Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2010 on the effect of the historical 
perspective on EU conditionality
18
; Tzifakis, 2012 on the causes of EU policy failure in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
19
; Belloni, 2016 on Euroscepticism in the WB
20
; Schwarz, 
2016 on factors that shape the enlargement process in South-Eastern Europe
21
; Bieber, 
2011 on state-building strategies in WB
22
). Despite the differences between these two 
enlargement rounds, there are also many similarities as the governing elites in CEE 
countries and in the Western Balkans are or were generally in favour of their country 
joining the EU. Furthermore, even if candidate states are not always successful in 
reforming their countries, the efforts are being made and are more or less visible. 
Therefore, it would be rational to assume that in areas where countries have already 
achieved alignment, they would continue on that path to ensure current EU members 
recognise their commitment and efforts to join. As membership conditions are non-
negotiable, there should also be no doubt as to which parts of the acquis are more 
important – they are all intended to be fully aligned with. 
The European Union has set criteria for membership which seems straightforward as the 
end goal would be a candidate state that is democratic, has a stable market economy and 
has adopted the acquis in full. As agreed by many, however, there are possibilities to 
interpret this criteria in so many different ways that scholars struggle with researching 
EU conditionality, and the representatives of candidate states that need to fulfil the 
criteria are puzzled by what exactly the end result should look like. This is turn raises 
doubts as to whether fulfilling the technical criteria leads to membership or is the 
decision mainly political. Political scientist Heather Grabbe who is also the former 
                                                 
18
 Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, 'Legacies and Leverage: EU Political Conditionality and 
Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective', Europe-Asia Studies, 62.3, (2010), 443-460 
19
 Nikolaos Tzifakis, 'Bosnia's Slow Europeanisation', Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 
13.2, (2012), 131-148 
20
 Roberto Belloni, (2016) 'The European Union Blowback? Euroscepticism and its Consequences in the 
Western Balkans', Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, published online, (2016), 1-18 
21
 Oliver Schwarz, 'Two steps forward one step back: what shapes the process of EU enlargement in 
South-Eastern Europe?', Journal of European Integration, 38.7, (2016), 757-773 
22
 Florian Bieber, 'Building Impossible States? State-building Strategies and EU Membership in the 
Western Balkans', Europe-Asia Studies, 63.10, (2011), 1783-1802 
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senior advisor to then European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, explains in 
her research on EU conditionality that “readiness to join” largely lies in the eye of the 
beholder as even the current member states use different means to achieve compatibility 
with EU standards: 
“Do new member states need a German economy, British civil 
service, Swedish welfare state, and French electoral system? Or 
how about a Greek economy, Belgian civil service, Austrian 
industrial relations, and Italian electoral system? The European 
Union does not present a uniform model of democracy or 
capitalism, and neither has it tried to define one. Diversity is a key 
feature of the Union, and the principle of integration while 
respecting difference remains important.
23” 
Fulfilling the conditions of membership is not an easy task and the strategy that works 
in one country might produce different outcomes in another. In general, conditionality 
can be seen as a mode of influence whereby external incentives are used to induce 
change through offering certain rewards in exchange for preferred policy positions or 
reforms.
24
 According to this logic, change is always more easily achievable if there are 
material benefits or rewards that the target country would receive in return. In the case 
of EU enlargement, the ultimate reward is membership of the European Union, but there 
are also several other benchmarks that help convince member states that the end goal is 
achievable and the membership offer is credible. 
In the following chapter, an overview of current research on EU membership 
conditionality is presented. Namely, the purpose is to identify factors that help ensure 
compliance and to ascertain how patterns of norm transfer and adoption differ from one 
another. The thesis will firstly focus on defining the concept of conditionality and 
exemplifying how this concept has been used thus far in literature. Secondly, the thesis 
discusses different methods how scholars have studied conditionality both in CEE and 
ongoing enlargement processes and thirdly, the thesis will turn to EU Common Foreign 
                                                 
23
 Grabbe, p. 250 
24
 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, 'Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe', Journal of European Public Policy, 11.4, (2004), 
661-679 
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and Security Policy and research on sanctions in general in order to explain the 
normative implications behind aligning with restrictive measures. The chapter then 
concludes with an insight on how to answer the research question and shed light on the 
Western Balkan enlargement in relation to CFSP alignment by using existing research 
frameworks and concepts. 
2.1 EU membership conditionality and norm transfer 
Scholars have written numerous books and articles on EU conditionality and the 
compliance patterns of member states. Particularly, there are countless articles written 
on the success of the 2004 and the 2007 enlargement to CEE states (see Grabbe, 2002
25
; 
Haughton, 2007
26
; Pop-Eleches, 2007
27
; Sasse, 2011
28
; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004
29
). Over time, studies on conditionality and enlargement have 
expanded to include the current candidate and/or potential candidate states (e.g. see 
Bieber, 2012
30
; Schimmelfennig, 2011
31
; Anastasakis, 2008
32
; Freyburg and Richter, 
2010
33
) and even third states which have no immediate prospect of joining the European 
Union, but nevertheless display a pattern of compliance (see Burlyuk and Shapovalova, 
2017
34
; Buşcaneanu, 201535). However, research shows that there are different reform 
processes at work in different countries and the effect of EU conditionality varies across 
time, states and policy areas where EU is able to influence domestic reforms or policy 
positions. 
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 Grabbe, p. 250 
26
 Tim Haughton, 'When does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the Accession Process in 
Central and Eastern Europe', Political Studies Review, 5.2, (2007), 233-246 
27
 Grigore Pop-Eleches, 'Between Historical Legacies and the Promise of Western Integration: 
Democratic Conditionality after Communism, East European Politics and Societies, 21.1, (2007), 142–
161 
28
 Gwendolyn Sasse, 'The Politics of EU Conditionality: the Norm of Minority Protection during and 
beyond EU Accession', Journal of European Public Policy, 15.6, (2011), 842-860 
29
 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, pp. 661-679 
30
 EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans, ed. by Florian Bieber (London: Routledge, 2012) 
31
 Frank Schimmelfennig, 'EU Political Accession Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement: 
Consistency and Effectiveness, Journal of European Public Policy, 15.6, (2011), 918-937 
32
 Othon Anastasakis, 'The EU’s Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a More 
Pragmatic Approach', Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8.4, (2008), 365-377 
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The compliance of non-member states with EU policies may have several reasons, but 
the most often stated one is definitely the prospect of joining the EU in the future which 
is desirable for many reasons. One of the most clearly advocated one is the possibility to 
participate in the single market as it is anticipated that access to a market with 500 
million potential consumers, clear standards and non-discrimination would bring 
economic growth, prosperity and stability to their citizens. Other reasons for accepting 
EU conditionality include the “returning to Europe” discourse that was dominant during 
the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds. Returning to or being part of Europe is also 
relevant when talking about the ongoing enlargement to Western Balkans. 
It is necessary to remember that EU membership would bring clear benefits, but there 
are also policies that are a clear mismatch with candidate states' current positions and 
therefore are not acceptable to some domestic actors. Whereas there was room for 
compromise during the earlier enlargement rounds in the second half of the 20
th
 century, 
it became obvious with the 2004 and 2007 enlargements that accession criteria of the 
EU are non-negotiable. Therefore, even though there are member states that managed to 
acquire opt-outs during the 1990s and early 2000s, aspiring states now need to adopt all 
acquis and conform to all policies and requirements that old member states have agreed 
to in the past. What is more, when taking into account enlargement fatigue and low 
popular support for enlargement in old member states, it is not surprising that current 
enlargement states of the Western Balkans would not receive any freedom to “cherry-
pick” suitable policies and parts of acquis. Therefore, the EU needs to have various 
strategies to influence change in many different areas and especially where there is deep 
reluctance to reform. 
Noutcheva argues in her book on European foreign policy and the Balkan challenges to 
accession that the compliance pattern of the government policies of these countries 
should be researched by focusing on three main factors. Namely, the perceived 
legitimacy of EU conditionality as seen by domestic actors, the costs of compliance and 
the ability and/or willingness of EU to use its powers to impose compliance when 
necessary.
36
 The author subsequently claims that in countries where legitimacy is 
perceived high, compliance is substantial, even though it may take time to manifest. The 
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final decision to comply is assumed due to the existence of strong societal actors that 
pressure the government to take up reforms by exposing possible weaknesses and 
failures to act by the government. Over time, the government is bound to moderate its 
position and through the accumulation of reforms the country aligns with more and 
more EU policies. 
When legitimacy is perceived to be low, there are two possible outcomes which depend 
on the costs of compliance as they become decisive for domestic actors. In countries 
where actors perceive that complying could serve their interests, compliance takes 
place, but is often partial or volatile, and as there are no domestic actors that would 
pressure reforms on the basis of the legitimacy of EU norms, this decision is ultimately 
based on rational cost-benefit calculation. Therefore, compliance is lacking in states 
where the legitimacy of EU conditionality is perceived as low and the costs of 
internalising norms or reforming policies is seen as too high. In the latter situation, the 
only way the EU is able to exert pressure to reform is by resorting to coercive power, 
but this usually leads to imposed or fake compliance with a high risk of domestic actors 
seeking to reverse the compliance trend due to its inappropriateness.
37
 Overall, there are 
four types of compliance – genuine/substantial, partial/volatile, imposed compliance 
which has a high possibility or reversed compliance and non-compliance.
38
 
This logic is in essence similar to the argument forwarded by Börzel and Risse in their 
paper on European integration and the top-down Europeanization of member states. The 
authors aim to review the literature on the EU's effect on domestic policies, politics and 
polities in order to get a clearer sense of the situation when Europeanization could bring 
about domestic change.
39
 In order for one to expect domestic reforms due to 
Europeanization, change needs to be inconvenient, or as Börzel and Risse put it: “there 
must be some degree of “misfit” or incompatibility between European-level processes, 
policies and institutions, on the one hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and 
institutions, on the other hand.
40” Secondly, as difference in policies is not enough in 
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itself, there need to be certain domestic actors or institutions that respond to pressures 
from the EU to reform. 
These domestic actors and/or institutions can increase pressure to change either due to 
the “logic of consequentialism” whereby reforms are pushed due to the expected gains 
or opportunities they would create for the interested party afterwards, or due to the 
“logic of appropriateness” whereby reforms are seen as legitimate and necessary as the 
norms they are based on are upheld and valued in a society. As March and Olsen 
explain it: 
“Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, 
expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations 
encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political 
community or group, and the ethos, practices, and expectations of its 
institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as 
appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation.
41” 
 
The logic of appropriateness is expected to produce long-lasting reforms and policy 
positions that result in genuine compliance by the aspiring member state as there is 
widespread understanding in society that these positions are in fact appropriate. The 
EU, through its conditionality and persuasion tactics, tries to exert influence in both 
ways, although the end goal would certainly be the internalisation of EU values in 
candidate states that would ensure that potential member states uphold and advocate 
these norms in the future as well. These two logics can also be defined as rationalist 
institutionalist and sociological institutionalist perspectives and while they produce 
chance through different patterns of reasoning, they are not mutually exclusive.
42
 
These institutionalist perspectives embody different logics, but they also rely on 
different factors and explanations as to what is able to facilitate change in society. 
While rationalist institutionalism sees actors as goal-oriented, cost-efficient and 
calculative in their decision-making process, sociological institutionalism assumes that 
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actors base their decisions on what is “right” or what constitutes as proper and socially 
accepted behaviour.
43
 Therefore, in the former perspective, it is possible to bring forth 
change through offering incentives that serve the interests of domestic parties and in the 
latter perspective, it is necessary to convince domestic actors or decision-makers by 
explaining the value or “appropriateness” of change. If successful, the domestic 
decision-makers would either absorb the policy positions by only slightly adjusting their 
former positions, accommodate the policy by adapting to it without changing the 
underlying collective understanding attached, or transform ones policy through 
accepting fundamental changes.
44
 
While choices based on rational decision-making are more likely in a situation where 
interests and strategies are clear, the socialisation process would prove more effective 
when domestic actors have clear identities or are interested in “belonging” to a certain 
group of countries.
45
 During the CEE enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007, it was clear 
that these countries aspire to become part of Europe again and therefore should uphold 
European values and norms. Generally, this was understood by most old member states, 
even if there was initially less clarity about whether all these states should become part 
of the EU in the future. What concerns the Western Balkans, there is increasingly an 
understanding that these states should in time move closer to the EU and uphold its 
values, but as can be observed from the general debate, there are fewer EU countries 
which strongly advocate for future enlargement to the Western Balkans. For this reason, 
I argue, it is even more important that the current potential and official candidate states 
take EU conditionality seriously in order to present themselves as worthy candidates for 
future EU membership. 
2.2 Importance of CFSP alignment 
Restrictive measures are an important part of EU CFSP and the sanctions put in place 
against Russia have clear normative grounds. As sanctions almost always come with a 
cost to those who align with them, it is important to keep in mind that suffering some 
kind of economic loss is part of a value-based decision. The latter shows that the target 
is or has been engaged in activities that are normatively unacceptable and the values 
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which need protection are more important than potential economic losses the parties 
might encounter. In general, the choice between suffering economic loss and upholding 
EU norms and values is clear when it comes to restrictive measures against Russia as 
many states have endured loss in trade as a consequence. Therefore, there is an 
extensive debate between actors who support the continuation of sanctions until the 
Minsk agreements are fulfilled and actors who advocate for dropping sanctions due to 
their inefficiency and major economic consequences for most of the EU countries. This 
debate, however, has not resulted in changing the union's policy as sanctions have been 
extended several times and the overall condemning position towards Russia's actions in 
Ukraine is solid. This agreement among member states is mainly in place as all member 
states understand the long-term consequences that result from accepting the violation of 
the rules-based international order as it would be even more damaging to the security of 
Europe and all its nations in the future. 
Hellquist shows through her research that generally third countries have been quite 
active in joining restrictive measures against different actors.
46
 In her paper, she claims 
that the sanctions alignment record shows that before the Ukrainian crisis and the 
following targeted sanctions, the candidate countries as well as other third states were 
willing to join other restrictive measures without extensive debate about the actual 
necessity or benefit from these sanctions. This is so because aligning with sanctions 
against countries with what there are no immediate cultural connections or economic 
relations concerned has been and continues to be a rather simple way to show normative 
commitment to EU norms and values. The objective of third states to present themselves 
as committed to EU values becomes even more obvious when considering that scholars 
have largely concluded that sanctions do not usually bring about intended changes in the 
policy of sanctioned states.
47
 Therefore, the choice to align with economic sanctions 
may be interpreted as an indication of a normative commitment to certain values and 
sanctions do not need to necessarily be linked with rational calculations. At least this 
was the case before sanctions were put in place against Russia. 
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Aligning with sanctions the EU has put in place can have many different explanations. 
Many third countries (i.e. candidate countries, Eastern partnership countries etc.) are 
interested in having good relations with the EU and if restrictive measures do not come 
with important economic or other consequences, it is a fairly simple way to show 
support and preparedness to be included in the value space of the EU. What concerns 
Russia, there is a visibly different pattern as even candidate countries do not always 
align. Reluctance to join is displayed despite the fact that these countries have 
potentially more to lose when they show their unwillingness to align with the policies of 
the union they intend to be part of as soon as possible. Obviously, this raises concerns 
whether the candidates are actually willing to show solidarity with the EU in different 
foreign policy matters and if they are subsequently willing to uphold and promote its 
norms. As solidarity has become one of the most important values in the EU during the 
last decade (notably after terrorist attacks and during debt, migration and the Ukraine 
crises) it is vital that current member states see that candidate countries are actually 
willing to set their interests aside and “do what needs to be done”. 
As the EU already has difficulties in “speaking with a single voice” in its foreign policy, 
it is clear that new members who do not even act as “good students” before they join the 
EU, are not welcome. When this general lack of willingness to act in solidarity would 
be considered together with low public support in old member states towards future 
enlargement, the necessity to show full commitment becomes even more obvious. As 
most decisions in Brussels are taken by consensus (and foreign policy decisions are 
always taken by consensus) it is highly likely that the EU might turn into an ineffective 
union of countries that is unable to pursue a common goal and work together in the 
international arena. 
Furthermore, since the EU is already seen by many as a massive bureaucracy that has 
been unable to show success when directing change in its neighbourhood, it might 
prove fatal to the EU if the inability to take decisions becomes even more widespread in 
more policy areas. What is more, closer cooperation in foreign policy has gained wider 
support lately in relation to the global strategy introduced by High Representative 
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Federica Mogherini
48
 and the election of Donald Trump as the President of United 
States. Therefore, many countries have made their case as to why the EU should be 
more active in its neighbourhood as well as globally. Enlargement to countries where 
this vision is not shared is only going to decrease the chances of successful enhanced 
cooperation in the future. 
2.3 What influences CFSP alignment? 
The main purpose of this Master's thesis is to comparatively analyse the differences 
between the arguments presented by the Western Balkan countries in relation to EU 
CFSP alignment. The analysis on the substance of statements is complemented by a 
comparison of the ethnic divisions and general public support for EU membership 
which enable to draw conclusions on possible domestic policy change. The presence of 
potential domestic actors that could advocate for policy changes is concluded through 
ethnic divisions because the political party structure in the WB is still somewhat 
ethnicity-based and ethnic violence that characterised their recent history is still 
affecting policy decisions. The official position of the EU is presented by including the 
statements concerning CFSP and EU enlargement that high officials of the union 
forward during their meetings as it enables to understand the extent of pressure from the 
EU to align with its foreign policy positions. Therefore, this part of the thesis shows 
whether EU conditions are functional in the Western Balkans. Following this logic, if 
the legitimacy of EU conditions is perceived to be credible, alignment should be 
assumed. Therefore, the aim is to shed light as to why some of these countries have 
chosen to support EU foreign policy positions (namely, the restrictive measures against 
Russia) and what differentiates them compared to those that have not. While CFSP 
alignment was progressive in most countries before the Ukrainian crisis, the overall 
degree of alignment has decreased in some, despite the fact that all have expressed their 
aspiration to join the EU. 
As noted in the theory chapter of this thesis, the perceived legitimacy of EU conditions 
is one of the most important factors that could influence policy change in enlargement 
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countries. The position of the EU in relation to non-aligning states is therefore vital for 
this analysis and helps to understand whether these states might give in to EU's 
requirements in order to keep their membership perspective alive. Secondly, I will 
analyse the ethnic composition of these member states and the public support for 
membership in order to draw conclusions about the existence of domestic actors who 
might aim to influence their government's current policy. Thirdly, I will include 
country-specific arguments on EU CFSP alignment or non-alignment in order to 
determine whether their decisions are based on the normative basis of EU membership 
and/or their own rational interests serving the individual needs of their countries. 
Therefore, the thesis aims to understand which factors influence CFSP alignment in the 
Western Balkan countries concerning Russia-related foreign policy positions. 
The underlying purpose for this thesis is to analyse the types of arguments domestic 
actors use to explain compliance or non-compliance. Thus, to understand the decisions 
of candidates, the substance of their arguments is essential to comprehend. It is expected 
that the WB states which do not align with EU restrictive measures on Russia mostly 
resort to rational arguments where the main focus is on their own potential losses from 
aligning with this type of policy, but countries who do align, mostly explain it in terms 
of the normative obligations they as European states have. While the arguments could 
be a mixture of the two, it is expected that in general, the countries that focus on norms 
and values in their foreign policy choices align with sanctions which have strong 
normative grounds – as it is in the case of the Ukrainian crisis. 
The dependent variable in this Master's thesis is therefore compliance with EU CFSP 
(more specifically sanctions on Russia) which is operationalised as aligning and non-
aligning countries. It is not obvious by just looking at percentage points of alignment 
from European Commission candidate county progress reports that the majority of 
declarations, policies and Council decisions which some countries do not align with are 
not supportive of Russian policy, and therefore it is important to concentrate of specific 
policies that relate to restrictive measures against Russia. The chapter on methodology 
further explains the need to focus on alignment vis-à-vis Russia. 
The independent variables used in this thesis are the legitimacy of EU conditions 
concerning EU CFSP alignment, the ethnic divisions and public support for EU 
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membership and the substance of the arguments the WB countries present to EU 
officials to explain their alignment or non-alignment. The dominance of either rational 
arguments or normative commitment is expected to give the most conclusive empirical 
explanation as to why these potential or official candidate countries have either decided 
to act in solidarity with the EU or not. While it is not possible to conclude that a state 
uses either one or the other type of reasoning, it is assumed that either rational or 
normative explanations dominate. Furthermore, the differentiation between normative 
and rational arguments combined with the presence of ethnic divisions in candidate 
countries allows us to better understand whether and on what conditions a 100% 
alignment would be possible in the future. This thesis therefore tests the following: 
Hypothesis 1: The functionality of EU CFSP conditions is lower in non-aligning rather 
than in aligning countries. 
Hypothesis 2: Normative arguments are more likely to be used by aligning rather than 
by non-aligning countries. 
Hypothesis 3: Rational arguments are more likely to be used by non-aligning rather than 
by aligning countries. 
Hypothesis 4a: Countries with only one major ethnic group are less likely to alter their 
CFSP alignment than countries with more major ethnic groups. 
Hypothesis 4b: Countries with more than one major ethnic group are more likely to alter 
their CFSP alignment than countries with one major ethnic group. 
The following chapter will give an overview of the method I intend to use in order to 
test these hypotheses and answer the research question: which factors influence CFSP 
alignment in the Western Balkan countries concerning Russia-related foreign policy 
positions? While other independent variables are also discussed in the following 
chapters, the main the focus is on the normative-rational dimension as it can be argued 
that by resisting alignment, these states contest the primacy of EU values and norms in 
their societies
49
 and therefore might not be suitable candidates for EU membership in 
the future. 
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3. Methodology 
Change can generally be asserted by either top-down or bottom-up pressure. This thesis 
will focus on both as the statements of EU high officials as well as the response and 
willingness to align by the governments of official or potential candidate states is 
researched. Even though the countries chosen for this analysis are similar in their 
historical backgrounds, they are relatively different in their policy positions and their 
relations with third countries. For this reason, it makes sense to analyse variables 
inductively as it allows researching the subjects without imposing any predetermined 
explanations on the cases that would not be suitable in their respective domestic 
contexts. In the following sub-paragraphs, it is also explained why these countries are 
chosen for analysis, how variables are operationalised and what limitations this research 
method presents. 
3.1 Case selection 
The countries at the focus of this thesis are the official and potential candidate states of 
the European Union. Currently, there are five official candidate states and two potential 
candidate states which are all facing numerous difficulties in aligning with EU policies. 
Some of them, however, can already present 100% alignment with EU CFSP very early 
in their accession processes. The official candidate states are Montenegro, Serbia, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
50
 and Albania. The potential 
candidate states are Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo.
51
 These states have 
similar and closely intertwined history and therefore, it can be argued that in general 
this region faces specific and similar obstacles which make them largely comparable. 
Overall, the problems these countries struggle with have common traits as they are often 
derived from past ethnic conflicts in the region and subsequent declarations for 
independence (e.g. Montenegro and Kosovo from Serbia). 
First and foremost, the cases chosen for this analysis are determined by the number of 
current potential and official candidate states of the EU. Furthermore, as the conditions 
of EU membership and the historical backgrounds of the current enlargement rounds 
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and previous rounds are quite different, it does not make sense to include any other 
previous candidate states in this analysis. Croatia, which joined the EU most recently in 
2013 could be a possible additional case, but as this type of analysis limits the amount 
of cases that can be included, in this thesis I have focused only on those six countries 
that are currently seen as possible member states of the EU. When considering that 
increasing the number of cases would in turn decrease the analytical depth, it is sensible 
to limit the cases to the WB countries. I will, however, include a short paragraph on 
Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria in the subchapter that compares these six cases. 
Though an official candidate, Turkey is not included in this thesis both due to its 
different history with the European Union as well as because of events that have 
changed Turkey's perspective to join the union at all. Following the coup attempt in July 
2016 and April 2017 referendum that gave the current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
a mandate to bring forth reforms in order to develop Turkey into a presidential system 
of government, the EU has largely accepted its inability to effect meaningful change in 
Turkey. The European Parliament has called for the suspension of Turkey's membership 
talks for some time now,
52
 but it is only after the referendum when the Enlargement 
Commissioner Johannes Hahn also raised the question of a possible new format for 
cooperation which should be developed in cooperation with Turkey.
53
 
The analysis focuses on comparing Western Balkan countries also due their domestic 
variety which would allow determining why some states align and some do not. As the 
ethnic composition and public support for EU membership are different in the 
mentioned states, these variables might help to explain the CFSP compliance patterns. 
A comparison of these countries in relation to their ethnic groups and popular support is 
likely to give an insight whether change in policy positions could be assumed in the 
future or if there is strong public support for the current government and/or its policies. 
Ethnic divisions are vital to include for understanding the potential variety of domestic 
actors who might want to influence the accession process. As is known, not all of these 
states display a strong support for EU membership and some have competing domestic 
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actors that are fighting against the current agenda of their governments to continue 
European integration and to seek membership in organisations that uphold and promote 
Western norms and values. Therefore, the cases included in this paper are very similar 
in some aspects and different in others, but a comparative approach could explain the 
CFSP alignment in the region in a more holistic way. 
3.2 Operationalisation 
In this thesis, the dependent variable 'alignment' is operationalised as aligning and non-
aligning countries. While potential or official candidate countries could align with most 
other EU CFSP declarations, policies and conclusions, in this thesis only sanctions 
alignment on Russia is presented. Therefore, if a country aligns with sanctions on 
Russia, it is presented as an aligning country and if it does not, it is considered to be a 
non-aligning country. While other CFSP policies are also important and note that the 
candidate country is willing to show commitment to EU values, the major normative 
conflict currently lies in the EU's relation with Russia, and solidarity from member 
states is first and foremost requested for this foreign policy instrument. The relevant 
alignment data is collected from European Commission's annual progress reports on 
enlargement countries and government websites in the case of Kosovo which is not 
officially invited to align by the EU. 
The independent variables included in this thesis are the legitimacy of EU conditionality 
in relation to CFSP, the substance of arguments (either mainly normative or rational) 
used by WB governments to explain their alignment or non-alignment and the ethnic 
divisions and public support for EU in these societies. In order to analyse the alignment 
of potential and official candidate countries and differentiate the reasons why some of 
these countries have joined sanctions on Russia, I will firstly present the overall 
alignment data from 2011-2016. These statistics show how candidate state alignment is 
connected with the focus years. It will also show which countries opted in favour of 
alignment and which ones preferred to focus on their national interests instead. Tracking 
the alignment record also before the Ukrainian crisis enables to divide this group of 
countries by their general compliance patterns and then move towards analysing the 
reasons behind these foreign policy choices in 2014 and afterwards. 
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The first variable tested in this thesis is the legitimacy of EU conditions as it relates to 
alignment with CFSP and sanctions on Russia. In order to understand whether the 
Western Balkan states' governments understand that EU conditions are non-negotiable, 
this thesis will firstly present the general position of EU high officials and then include 
the response from the candidates. It is expected that the union does not use coercive 
power to pressure non-aligning states to change their policy positions and join sanctions 
on Russia and resulting from this, these states do not see the need to align. The data 
analysed in this thesis is derived from government websites, EU press releases as well 
as local news reporting on the visits of EU high officials to the Western Balkan 
countries. EU conditions could be seen as legitimate when (potential) candidate 
countries aim to explain their non-alignment or alignment. If the countries focused on in 
this thesis refuse to align with some parts of CFSP (including sanctions against Russia) 
as they see it is not and will never be in their interest to align, the legitimacy of EU 
conditions is seen to be weak. 
As it is not possible to claim for certain that all these officials use the same kind of 
policy lines during their meetings behind closed doors, there is little certainty that 
coercive language is not used during meetings between candidate states' representatives 
and EU officials, but if this coercive power is not used in public statements and press 
conferences then the Western Balkan governments are less likely to respond to pressure 
if aligning is not in their interest. Since legitimacy is difficult to measure, it may not be 
possible to give definite answers to the assumption, but it is expected that the perceived 
legitimacy is mirrored in the statements by WB officials as they aim to explain their 
non-compliance or compliance with these EU conditions. 
While some countries display a 100% commitment to work together with the EU in 
“speaking with a single voice” in foreign policy, some have chosen to face criticism 
from the EU after failing to comply. As the reasons behind aligning with EU policy 
positions are almost as important to this thesis as the explanations for non-compliance, 
all these countries are compared and contrasted in order to answer the research question 
and test the hypotheses. Therefore, the main independent variable included in the thesis 
is the substance of arguments presented by government representatives aimed at 
explaining their alignment or non-alignment. The substance of arguments is generally 
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either normative if the country focuses on EU values and norms when commenting on 
its alignment (or non-alignment), and rational if the state is unwilling or unable to align 
due to its own self-interest. The latter is seen to be rational as the state would have to 
choose between possible losses to its economy or negative effects related to its national 
interests and will therefore rather ignore EU values and norms than join sanctions on 
Russia. 
Therefore, in order to conclude whether states use rational or normative arguments to 
explain their compliance or non-compliance, the substance of their arguments is 
important. However, in order to increase reliability, these arguments are also positioned 
in relation to relevant background information specific to these countries in order to 
decrease chances that government officials use certain arguments just to please EU 
officials or their own citizens. Data for the analysis is taken from all available media 
outlets and government websites that are translated into English. As the use of English-
language media and websites might be seen as too limiting for my research, this choice 
is also explained in a more detailed manner in the subchapter on limitations. 
As there is never full certainty in political science that a policy position and its 
explanation is indeed genuine and is in line with the what is perceived to be true, it is 
not likely that definite answers can be given to the research question, but comparative 
analysis of the current six enlargement states is still necessary is order to understand 
whether different approach from the EU might be able to increase the alignment record 
in these countries. In order to increase or decrease the legitimacy of rational arguments 
by different governments, the relevant trade figures of these countries (i.e. main import 
and export partners) are also included. 
Thirdly, the ethnic divisions and public support data are also presented in the analysis. 
This is done in order to compare the existence of possible actors who could be 
interested in altering the foreign policy of their respective countries. While ethnicity is 
not the only factor that helps to distinguish between domestic actors or guides their 
policy positions, it is relevant in the case of the Western Balkan countries as the legacy 
of ethnic conflicts is still fresh in the memories of their citizens and the political party 
structure is also often developed by taking different ethnic groups into account. The data 
for analysis is taken from the CIA World Factbook which is an often used database as it 
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offers comparable and reliable information which is collected regularly and in a 
consistent manner. The data for comparing the public support for the EU and its 
membership is taken from reports by the EU-funded Regional Cooperation Council that 
regularly conducts public opinion surveys in the Western Balkan, but in order to 
increase reliability, statistics are also taken from other sources and included in the 
footnotes of relevant subchapters. 
The above-mentioned variables are used in this thesis as it needs to be analysed whether 
the enlargement countries see the EU as a normative power whose values should have 
primacy and should be defended and promoted in the world, or is joining mostly 
supported due to the expected wealth it would bring. While the EU is often seen as an 
economic actor that has a stable economy and a market of 500 million citizens, it is 
likely that the candidates also aspire to join the EU only due to the possible economic 
gains that they could receive in the future. As foreign policy is one the most obvious 
policy fields where the union tries to promote its norms and values, this thesis is built 
upon the premise that its member states should put values first even if it might bring 
some economic losses or is not in their short-term national interests. 
3.3 Limitations 
One of the main limitations of this thesis is the focus on English-language media and 
documents. However, it needs to be clarified whether the reasoning presented to the 
domestic audience or to EU and its member states is analysed. As this Master's thesis 
attempts to shed light on the communication between the national governments and the 
high officials of the European Union, the emphasis is on international or English-
language media. Therefore, even though understanding the viewpoints of all the 
affected parties (including all domestic actors) would enable deeper knowledge of the 
domestic feelings on the subject, in this thesis the focus is on official policies and 
statements by government representatives. These are the people who often meet with 
EU officials, discuss future enlargement and the successes/setbacks on their reform 
paths. In addition, while other domestic actors might seek a wider platform for their 
arguments as well, they often lack an international audience in Brussels and other states 
outside their region. In order to test the legitimacy of English-language media which 
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this thesis is based on, comparative articles in other languages from domestic media and 
websites are included when needed and possible. 
The second limitation is related with the official policy of the EU high officials. While 
is it widely known that public talking points and private discussions have a tendency to 
have somewhat different character and strength, it is not possible to analyse what goes 
on behind closed doors during meetings between EU officials and government 
representatives. That is, if you have not had the chance to attend these meetings or do 
not have the resources to interview the participants. However, if these discussions do 
not lead to changes in policy, it might be suitable to analyse the public statements of 
officials as well. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Alignment with EU CFSP and sanctions on Russia 
What concerns foreign policy, the European Union expects progressive alignment from 
candidate states. This means that even though 100% alignment shows great 
commitment to the accession process and the norms and values the EU represents, full 
alignment is not requested early on in the enlargement process. Therefore, candidate 
states have legitimate arguments not to align when they refer to requirements of the 
accession process and their national concerns about aligning with policies that could 
potentially affect them negatively. However, it must be remembered that once a 
candidate aligns to a certain degree, it does not bode well for the state if alignment starts 
to reduce. Furthermore, lowering degree of alignment is definitely not in line with 
official EU policy and requirements for candidate states. 
Currently there are two Western Balkan states that fully align with EU foreign policy – 
Montenegro and Albania. These states are either already members of NATO (Albania) 
or will become members in the near future (Montenegro). While in 2011 Albania 
aligned itself with 95% (64 out of 67) of EU declarations and Council decisions,
54
 the 
country displayed its full commitment to EU policies already the following year.
55
 All 
in all, Albania's alignment has been 100% since 2012 and this has not decreased in the 
following years. The 2015 progress report noted that 
“On the common foreign and security policy, Albania aligned itself 
with all relevant EU declarations and European Council conclusions 
(100% alignment). This trend has been consistent for the last few 
years, thus demonstrating a very clear commitment in supporting 
the positions promoted by the European Union on issues related to 
international peace and security.
56” 
Montenegro has shown a similar commitment by aligning with 99% of EU positions, 
declarations and Council decisions in 2011.
57
 Already in 2012 Montenegro achieved a 
                                                 
54
 Albania 2011 Progress Report: Chapter 31, European Commission, 12 October 2011 
55
 Albania 2012 Progress Report: Chapter 31, European Commission, 10 October 2012 
56
 Albania 2015 Progress Report: Chapter 31, European Commission, 10 November 2015 
57
 Montenegro 2011 Progress Report: Chapter 31, European Commission, 12 October 2011 
34 
 
100% alignment record and has honoured its commitment since then. In 2014, the 
European Commission's report stated: 
“Montenegro generally aligned itself with and implemented 
restrictive measures introduced by Council decisions, including EU 
restrictive measures in the context of Russia’s illegal annexation of 
Crimea and events in eastern Ukraine. Montenegro voted in favour 
of the UN General Assembly Resolution on the territorial integrity 
of Ukraine.
58” 
The rest of Western Balkan potential and official candidate states have not shown 
commitment similar to Montenegro and Albania as before the Ukrainian crisis their 
CFSP alignment record was higher than it has been after sanctions on Russia were put 
in place. The CFSP alignment statistics show that before 2014 Serbia and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also had close to 90% or even 100% alignment 
record, but joining sanctions against Russia proved to be too difficult for them. The 
2014 progress report on Serbia's accession process states: 
“Serbia supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine in general terms but was absent at the vote of the UN 
General Assembly Resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine. 
Serbia did not align itself, when invited, with Council decisions 
introducing restrictive measures in the context of Russia’s illegal 
annexation of Crimea and events in eastern Ukraine. The Serbian 
government gave reassurances that Serbia would not actively seek 
to take undue advantage of the situation arising from the 
introduction of the Russian embargo on imports of EU agricultural 
products in answer to the restrictive measures against Russia.
59” 
Therefore, not only did Serbia refuse to align with the sanctions regime, it was also 
questionable for the EU whether Serbia would not take advantage of the situation in 
order to pursue its own interests. Increased trade levels with Russia could prove to be 
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likely as Serbia's relations with Russia have been and continue to be more proactive 
than other countries' in the region: 
“High-level contacts with Russia continued. Russia’s President 
visited Serbia in October 2014. Serbia’s President attended the 
celebration of Victory Day in Moscow and members of the 
presidential guard participated in the military parade. Serbian and 
Russian airborne forces held joint military drills in November 2014 
and together with Byelorussians forces in September 2015.
60” 
What concerns the FYROM, alignment record was remarkable before 2014 and even 
reached full alignment (100%) in 2012. From then on, however, FYROM has aligned 
with about 70% of EU CFSP declarations, positions and decisions. These do not include 
sanctions against the Russian Federation: 
“The country did not align itself with the Council decisions 
introducing restrictive measures in response to Russia’s illegal 
annexation of Crimea and events in eastern Ukraine. The country 
voted in favour of the UN General Assembly Resolution on the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine […] The country’s alignment with 
EU declarations and Council decisions in the field of foreign and 
security policy deteriorated as compared with previous years and 
needs to be improved.
61” 
The 2015 FYROM progress report concluded that even though the country generally 
aligned with EU's positions on Russia and condemned its actions in neighbouring 
countries, there is still no alignment in relation to economic sanctions against Russia: 
“On the common foreign and security policy, the country aligned 
itself, when invited, with 27 out of 40 EU declarations and Council 
Decisions (68% alignment). On the illegal annexation of Crimea by 
Russia and events in eastern Ukraine, the country aligned its foreign 
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policy in broad terms with the EU’s stance but not with the Council 
Decisions introducing restrictive measures over those issues.
62” 
Out of the two current potential candidate countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only 
one whose CFSP alignment is tracked and noted in progress reports. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina's alignment trend has not been overly positive in the past, but the record is 
generally progressive. In 2011, Bosnia and Herzegovina aligned with 58% of EU 
foreign policy decisions and/or declarations, but in 2016 it already decided to align with 
77%. The country has not, however, joined sanctions against Russia, largely due to the 
opposition of the Serb majority in Republika Srpska: 
“Bosnia and Herzegovina did not align itself with Council decisions 
introducing EU restrictive measures in the context of Russia’s 
illegal annexation of Crimea and events in eastern Ukraine, as there 
was no consensus within the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina was absent at the vote on the UN General 
Assembly Resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
63” 
As mentioned, Kosovo is the only country from the case selection whose alignment is 
not recorded as it is not invited to align with EU CFSP declarations, positions and 
Council decisions due to its status.
64
 However, the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement signed between EU and Kosovo just last year also includes the necessity to 
progressively align with EU policies and take part in the political dialogue.
65
 The 
overall CFSP alignment record during the period 2011-2016 can therefore be concluded 
as follows: 
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Table 1. Enlargement country EU CFSP alignment 2011-2016. 
Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Sanctions 
(Russia) 
Serbia N/A* 99% 89% 62% 65% 59% No 
Montenegro 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Yes 
FYROM 99% 100% 94% 73% 68% 73% No 
Albania 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Yes 
BiH 68% 56% 66% 52% 62% 77% No 
Kosovo N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes** 
Data: European Commission country-specific progress reports 
* The 2011 Serbia progress report did not specify a percentage, but noted: “Serbia has in most instances, 
when invited, aligned itself with Council decisions, EU declarations and démarches.
66” 
** Even though Kosovo is not invited to align with CFSP yet, it has introduced sanctions against Russia 
on its own initiative.
67
 
The statistics of alignment presented in Table 1 clearly show that before 2014 there was 
no large scale opposition to EU policies. Generally the (potential) candidate countries 
even aligned with sanctions, but when restrictive measures were put in place against 
Russia, some Western Balkan countries failed to act in solidarity with current EU 
member states. In conclusion, there were only three states that aligned with the 
sanctions regime – Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo. Among these, Montenegro is the 
most advanced candidate state (most acquis chapters already opened), Albania is still 
waiting for a positive decision from the EU to start the accession negotiation process 
and Kosovo is still not recognised by five EU member states and is not an official 
candidate. Their overall progress is therefore very different and this in turn shows that 
the political decision to align could be made very early in the accession process to show 
commitment and respect for EU values. 
4.2 EU sanctions on Russia and their perceived legitimacy 
European Union imposed sanctions against the Russian Federation in response to the 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and Russia's actions aimed at destabilising eastern 
Ukraine. These sanctions consist of a variety of different measures. They include 
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diplomatic measures (e.g. the suspension of Russia's negotiations to join OECD, 
cancelling the EU-Russia summit and the G8 meeting in Sochi and holding a G7 
meeting in Brussels instead), asset freezes for 150 people and 37 entities, visa bans, 
measures targeting specific sectors of Russian economy (major banks, energy and 
defence companies, and their subsidiaries), etc. In relation to the annexation of Crimea, 
there are sanctions in place that restrict different types of economic cooperation with the 
peninsula (including in the field of infrastructure, tourism. transport, 
telecommunications and energy).
68
 As the sanctioned individuals, entities and 
companies are carefully listed in order to target specific people involved in destabilising 
the situation in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, the linkage between the 
reason for sanctioning and its normative background should be clear. 
There are different actors in the EU who are voicing their concerns over whether 
sanctions are effective enough to bring changes to Russia's policy in eastern Ukraine 
and Crimea, but until now the EU with its 28 member states has managed to extend 
sanctions after every 6 months. What is more, the EU still regularly re-evaluates the list 
of individuals against whom sanctions are put in place as six members of the State 
Duma from Crimea were added to the list in November 2016.
69
 Overall, even though 
member states have voiced concerns about extending sanctions, they have still acted in 
solidarity during the unanimous voting process in the Council. As foreign policy 
remains in the competence of member states and any one member state would be able to 
affect the continuation of restrictive measures, the certainty that sanctions will be 
extended is rather low. Therefore, it is important that EU officials remind member states 
of the necessity of these sanctions and the values they stand for. Until now, the union 
has managed to set aside their individual concerns and “speak in a single voice” when it 
comes to foreign policy on Russia - and this is what the EU would expect from any new 
members as well, including the Western Balkan candidate countries. 
Even though individual member states generally confirm the need to align with EU 
CFSP and sanctions against Russia during their bilateral meetings with (potential) 
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candidate states, the strong signal from EU high officials concerning the need to align 
with EU acquis is even more important. This is so due to the European Commission's 
power to direct enlargement policy and monitor the compliance of candidate states on a 
day-to-day basis in between the Council meetings where enlargement might not be on 
the agenda very often. The work of Enlargement Commissioners and High 
Representatives for Foreign and Security Policy is most notable in this aspect as they 
are the officials who speak on behalf of the EU in this matter the most often. 
What concerns the focus of this thesis, the most important high officials of the EU after 
the 2014 Ukrainian crisis have been the previous Enlargement Commissioner Štefan 
Füle (2010-2014) and the current commissioner Johannes Hahn (2014-). Among other 
notable high officials that have been tasked with actively advocating to keep the 
Western Balkan integration on the agenda have been the previous and current High 
Representatives Catherine Ashton (2010-2014) and Federica Mogherini (2014-). 
Although some have been more active than others in supporting future enlargement, the 
following paragraphs include a short concluding overview of their general positions and 
statements on the subject of EU CFSP alignment in the Western Balkans. These are 
included in order to conclude whether the EU pressures the WB countries to align with 
CFSP or if a general agreement is in place that candidate countries are not required to 
fully align and should therefore join sanctions when they are ready. 
Soon after the Ukrainian crisis started in March 2014, Enlargement Commissioner 
Štefan Füle and High Representative Catherine Ashton both visited Serbia where it was 
concluded from meetings that Brussels understands the difficult position Serbia is in, 
but still reminds the candidate country that the EU expects enlargement states to support 
its policies, including in relation to restrictive measures. Therefore, it can also be 
concluded that the EU did not publicly insist too much as commissioner Füle announced 
that “the EU respected the position of Serbia as a sovereign country with regards to this 
issue.
70” Even though this might be seen as too soft of an approach from the EU that 
does not pressure candidate states to explain their position, Serbia still explained its 
reasoning by reminding that Serbia supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but their 
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own territorial integrity might also be in danger if Serbia would put sanctions in place 
against Russia and consequently lose Russia's support in the United Nations Security 
Council over the Kosovo status issue. 
After the next Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn took over, the position of the 
EU has not radically changed as he as well claimed to understand Serbia's policy 
position. In addition, he did not seem to have a clear plan on how to address the issue of 
CFSP alignment in Serbia and in other non-aligning Western Balkan states. During the 
3-hour-long hearing in the Foreign affairs committee of the European Parliament, Hahn 
indicated that “the fact that Serbia did not follow the EU's position is something we 
need to discuss. This will take time.
71” His answer did not include any specific ideas, 
but it is still very telling as it illustrates once more that the EU does not know how to 
approach this problem and accepts that not aligning with CFSP may be acceptable in 
certain situations. The fact that in 2017 the alignment record has not changed and the 
EU is still in the same situation is not surprising as during his first visit to Serbia, Hahn 
concluded during a press conference that “the situation is as it is and the European 
Union will expect Serbia to gradually harmonise its foreign policy, but this takes 
time.
72” 
However, the following quote has also been attributed to Commissioner Hahn: “Serbia 
has taken a legislative commitment within the EU accession negotiations to bring its 
positions in line with those of the EU. Harmonisation includes the tough issues as well, 
like the tough issue of sanctions against Russia. We are expecting of Serbia to hold on 
to these commitments.
73” High Representative Federica Mogherini has also noted 
during her visits to Western Balkan countries that alignment in all policy areas is not a 
suggestion, but a legal obligation that these countries have agreed to when they applied 
for EU membership: 
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“There is a legal obligation of progressive harmonization with EU 
positions, and we expect Serbia to comply with these obligations.
74” 
Even though EU politicians do not usually publicly demand that Serbia or any other 
candidate country aligns with sanctions on Russia as soon as possible, there have been 
reports of EU being firm on the policy of progressive alignment with EU CFSP. Thus, 
despite numerous reports from Russia-friendly media that the EU regularly threatens 
Serbia and gives the Western Balkans ultimatums,
75
 there have not been any threats to 
countries that do not align. Serbia's Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić has also refuted 
allegations that EU gives him ultimatums by insisting that this has not happened nor 
would he ever even allow it: 
“Our friends do not speak to us using the language of ultimatums. 
Nobody talks to me that way, and I would rather not be president of 
the Serbian government than allow something of that kind.
76” 
Therefore, while Serbia claims to understand the accession conditions and promises to 
align in due course, the reluctance of government officials to accept coercive pressure 
from the EU is notable. This reluctance is even more visible in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina's entity Republika Srpska as its President Milorad Dodik openly criticises 
Western sanctions on Russia and has promised never to join these unjust sanctions.
77
 
When candidate states align, however, the EU is very vocal in praising them about 
joining sanctions against Russia. In January 2017, during Montenegro's Prime Minister 
Duško Marković's visit to Brussels, the President of the European Council Donald Tusk 
was not shy on praising Montenegro for its 100% alignment with EU CFSP: 
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In foreign policy, Montenegro is already a de-facto EU Member. You 
are steadfast in protecting our values and interests, your troops serve 
alongside ours off the coast of the Horn of Africa and soon in Mali 
and you apply our sanctions against Russia. I thank you for your 
loyalty and support. […] I expressed the wish that your neighbours 
could follow you on this peaceful track and turn towards the 
future.
78” 
In general, the EU is not openly pushing candidate states to align with EU sanctions 
against Russia, but it does not forget to praise those that do. Albania and Montenegro 
have both consistently received positive comments from EU high officials, but in order 
not to distract candidate states from their overall accession process or push them away, 
no harsh criticism for non-alignment with sanctions against Russia is given to Serbia, 
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
It is possible to conclude from statements by government officials in response to the EU 
that increased pressure from Brussels would be seen very negatively by candidate states. 
This in turn enables to assume the legitimacy of EU's conditions in relation to foreign 
policy is weak and candidate states align only with policies that are not against their 
own national interests. As a result three WB states are either ignoring EU conditions in 
this area, promise to align, but at a later date or refer that they would never agree to 
align with everything the EU wants – especially when it is against their rational 
interests. The following subchapter will focus on the ethnic divisions and public opinion 
in the Western Balkans which is presented in order to ascertain whether the populations 
are united in their EU membership bids or if there are domestic actors who might not 
support the EU and the different reforms and policy changes their countries are 
requested to make. As the presence of a unified main agenda of a state has also helped 
previous candidate states in CEE countries to join the union despite frequent 
government changes, it is an important aspect that works in favour of a candidate.  
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4.3 Ethnic divisions and public support for EU membership 
The Western Balkan countries share many similarities, but it is important to note that 
there are also many differences. Table 2 illustrates that there are countries where one 
ethnicity strongly dominates (e.g. Serbia and Albania), but there are also countries 
where there are two (e.g. Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo) or even three major 
ethnic groups (e.g. Bosnia). This in turn influences the political structure in a society 
and political disagreements can become influential factors that create divisions in a 
country. This is especially so when one or more ethnic groups feel their concerns have 
not been addressed to a sufficient degree. The issue of national languages and foreign 
relations of a country are policy areas which can most often develop into important 
state-dividing factors that characterise a nation state where one ethnic group dominates 
over others. In addition, Table 2 also illustrates ethnic divisions in the Western Balkan 
(potential) candidate states by indicating with a “Yes” those countries where there is 
more than one major ethnic group. 
Table 2. Ethnic divisions in the Western Balkans. 
Country Ethnic groups Notable divisions
79
 
Serbia Serbs 83.3%, Hungarians 3.5% No 
Montenegro Montenegrin 45%, Serbian 28.7%, Bosniak 8.7%, Yes 
Macedonia Macedonian 64.2%, Albanian 25.2%, Yes 
Albania Albanian 82.6%, unspecified 15.5% No 
BiH Bosniak 50.1%, Serbian 30.8%, Croat 15.4% Yes 
Kosovo Albanians 92.9%, Bosniaks 1.6%, Serbs 1.5%
80
 Yes 
Data: CIA World Factbook country profiles.
81
 Data from 2011. 
Exceptions: Albania (2002), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013) 
Table 2 showed that there is a higher chance of political disagreements which could 
result from ethnic divisions in Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. Serbia and Albania are expected to be more united in their decision-making, or 
at least different political positions would not result from ethnic divisions. Overall, there 
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might be some truth in this assumption that the more different ethnic groups exist in a 
state, the bigger the chances that there will be a difference in opinions on what path 
should the state take in foreign policy. Table 3 introduces data about alignment with 
sanctions against Russia in order to compare whether there are any notable trends which 
might generally explain foreign policy choices. 
Table 3. Notable divisions compared with sanctions alignment.
82
 
Country Notable divisions Sanctions (Russia) 
Serbia No No 
Montenegro Yes Yes 
Macedonia Yes No 
Albania No Yes 
BiH Yes No 
Kosovo Yes
83
 Yes 
Data: Table is composed based on data in Table 2 and sanctions alignment data from European 
Commission progress reports. 
There are two states which do not have major ethnic divisions and four states that have, 
including Kosovo where divisions are mostly present in the northern part of the country. 
As we can conclude from this data, EU CFSP does not entirely depend on the existence 
or non-existence of ethnic divisions as Serbia does not align and Albania does align 
with sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, in Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo there is more than one major ethnic group, but their alignment 
record also varies. Therefore, we can conclude that ethnic divisions might in some cases 
be the determining factors in the Western Balkans concerning unity in foreign policy 
agenda, but they do not tell us much without actually looking into the severity of 
cleavages in foreign policy positions or the power of different actors to influence the 
state's agenda. Ethnic divisions, however, could help us to determine whether unity 
might be achieved in these countries. 
The next important factor that gives an insight into the possible cleavages in the 
Western Balkan states concerning their foreign policy positioning is public support to 
EU membership. In Albania, support for EU is very high – the 2015 Eurobarometer 
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indicates that 81% would see EU membership as a good thing, but there is less 
agreement other countries whose governments have been working towards EU 
membership. In the FYROM only 47% of people see future membership as a good thing 
while in Montenegro (38%) and Serbia (21%) support is even lower. However, it is 
important to note that when asked about the benefits of EU membership from Croatian 
people in 2013, the agreement among the population was also questionable (52%).
84
 
Table 4. Public opinion survey: “Do you think that EU membership would be a good 
thing, a bad thing or neither good or bad?” 
Country … a good thing (A) … a bad thing (B) Net support (A-B) 
Serbia
85
 21% 31% -10% 
Montenegro
86
 38% 18% 20% 
Macedonia
87
 47% 15% 32% 
Albania 81% 6% 75% 
BiH
88
 33% 21% 12% 
Kosovo 83% 2% 81% 
Data: Balkan Barometer 2016, Regional Cooperation Council
89
 
Therefore, the mere presence of very high public support towards the EU is not a 
prerequisite of its membership bid, but it certainly helps the government to introduce 
necessary reforms in order to move forward in the accession process. Table 4 presented 
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public support for EU membership as well as the percentage of responders who marked 
that they would be against their country's membership. Table 5 further explains the 
general support for EU by indicating the support for future EU membership and an 
indication of when the population expects enlargement to take place. 
Table 5. Public opinion: “In general, when do you expect the accession to EU to happen?” 
Country By 2020 By 2025 By 2030 Never 
Serbia 13% 18% 13% 32% 
Montenegro 36% 21% 8% 14% 
Macedonia 26% 25% 16% 28% 
Albania 41% 29% 13% 11% 
BiH 20% 18% 15% 33% 
Kosovo 52% 23% 15% 6% 
Data: Balkan Barometer 2016, Regional Cooperation Council
90
 
The Balkan Barometer is an EU-funded study of public opinion in the Western Balkans. 
As can be seen from Table 4, the study revealed that with the exception of Albania and 
Kosovo, less than half of the populations in these countries support EU membership. 
However, when we look at additional public opinion surveys, funded by governmental 
or other institutions in the Western Balkans (e.g. Serbian Integration Office, European 
Delegation to Montenegro and/or the Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” in 
Macedonia) we are able to see quite different results. In these cases, the support of the 
local population is higher when the study is carried out by local actors or funded by 
institutions that are interested in moving forward in the enlargement process. 
From Table 5 we could see that the people in Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo are the 
most hopeful that their respective countries will be members of the EU by 2020. It is 
interesting to note that while Montenegro's accession process has been the fastest 
among these six states, Albania has not even started its negotiations yet and Kosovo is 
still a potential candidate state. What is more, 32% of Serbian people do not expect their 
country to ever join the EU even though the accession negotiations are ongoing and 
Serbia's government is eagerly pushing for opening negotiations on multiple new 
chapters every year. 
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4.4 Official foreign policy positions in the Western Balkans 
The purpose of this subchapter is to analyse country-specific government policies in 
relation to CFSP alignment and sanctions against Russia. This is illustrated through 
statements and official policy positions that shed light on a country's general 
commitment to pursue EU membership and respect for EU norms and values in relation 
to foreign policy. More specifically, the arguments of high government officials 
concerning EU sanctions against Russia are introduced in order to support the 
distinction between rational and normative explanations. Research shows that although 
all countries understand the consequences of introducing sanctions against Russia on 
their economic and political situation, some countries have chosen to stand with the EU 
when it comes to protecting the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, but 
some have still opted for protecting their economic relations first which they see as 
being in the interest of their citizens. 
4.4.1 Serbia 
Serbia can be considered the candidate country whose leadership is the most vocal 
against EU sanctions on Russia. Their president, prime minister and ministers 
frequently voice their opinion concerning EU sanctions policy and reiterate their 
support for ending restrictive measures by hoping that the two Slavic nations, Ukraine 
and Russia, would find a peaceful solution and make these measures all together 
unnecessary. During the opening of the Development Center of the Russian 
Geographical Society in Serbia in October 2016, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic 
indicated that Serbia will never join sanctions against Russia as it continues to place 
importance on friendship and cooperation with Russia which should become even more 
meaningful in the future. According to him, Russia has been one of their most important 
pillars of support during their entire history and Serbian-Russian cooperation is rooted 
in their hearts. What concerns Serbia's strategic considerations, he claimed: 
“We are aware that, without cooperation with Russia, we would not 
be able fully to achieve our national interests, among which the most 
important one is the preservation of our sovereignty and territorial 
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integrity, especially before international organizations.
91” 
In conclusion, therefore, the official arguments can be divided into both categories – 
normative and rational, but what Serbs see as “appropriate” is not necessarily the values 
that the EU carries, but are more concerned with their own history, their friendship or 
even brotherhood with Slavic nations. During an interview for Al Jazeera, President 
Tomislav even indicated that if alignment with EU restrictive measures is an obligation, 
Serbia might reconsider its membership bid: 
“There are two conditions Serbia will not meet even if that means it 
will not become an EU member. The first one is to recognise the 
independence of Kosovo and Metohija. We will never do that. The 
second one is to have a quarrel with countries that the EU quarrels 
with. Here, I primarily refer to the sanctions against the Russian 
Federation or any other sanctions the EU may impose.
92” 
Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić has explained the question of Serbia's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity by explicitly stating that 
“for Serbia to impose sanctions on its greatest political partner, 
Russia, on whom our national interest depends - the person who 
would do that in Serbia would act directly against our national and 
state interest” […] “who will support Serbia in the UN Security 
Council if Serbia were to turn away from its allies, Russia and China, 
who stand as the only barrier to Kosovo joining the UN.
93” 
This quote indicates that even though Serbia might not recognise Crimea as part of 
Russia, it does it for selfish reasons as it would not be possible to claim Kosovo does 
not have the legitimate right to statehood. Serbia's relations therefore are deeply rooted 
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in Serbia's internal problems, but also in its history during the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia: 
“We respect the territorial integrity of every country member of the 
UN, including Ukraine, but Serbia will not join any sanctions on 
Russia, as that state is not just our friend and economic and political 
partner but a state that never imposed sanctions on Serbia.
94” 
This statement speaks volumes of the recent history of Serbia, 1999 NATO bombing 
campaign in Serbia and EU sanctions.
95
 The solution for Serbia is to not choose sides 
and claim their sovereign right to be neutral while they continue pursuing friendly 
relations with all parties – Russia, Ukraine and the EU as they argue that Serbia is a 
small country whose policies would not impact international relations anyway.
96
 The 
quest of neutrality, however, loses its legitimacy when taking into account military 
cooperation between Serbia and Russia. The latest high level meeting between Prime 
Minister Vučić and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin is just another 
example of their enhanced military cooperation, because among other topics discussed 
at the meeting, the military and technical cooperation was a key issue.
97
 Russia has also 
sold military equipment to Serbia at low cost
98
 and Serbia on its part hosted military 
exercises with Russia in parallel to NATO training exercises in neighbouring 
Montenegro.
99
 
As Dačić was preparing for the official visit of Vladimir Putin to Belgrade, he shed light 
to Russia-Serbia bilateral topics which would be discussed during the meetings and 
therefore, are potentially additional parts of the reason why Serbia would not join 
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sanctions against Russia. Instead of aligning with EU CFSP, Serbia plans to even 
further liberalise trade with Russia. Among other topics discussed were the South 
Stream gas pipeline, Serbia's Gazprom debt to Russia which could be compensated by 
giving Russia a stake in Serbia's petrochemical company HIP- Petrohemija, securing 
fuels for the upcoming winter, price cuts for industrial gas consumers, Russia's loan to 
Serbian Railways etc.
100
 Foreign Minister Dačić claimed that close bilateral relations 
with Russia are important as Western countries lack interest in Serbia - the last British 
Prime Minister to visit Belgrade was Margaret Thatcher and there are no recent visits by 
American presidents.
101
 Therefore, as harmonising with EU CFSP is not in the interests 
of Serbia, the government claims to follow the examples of other previous enlargement 
countries by aligning only by the end of their membership negotiations which will 
probably not happen in the near future.
102
 
In 2014 when the sanctions regime was initially put in place following the annexation of 
Crimea, presidential foreign policy adviser Ivan Mrkić insisted in an interview that 
“I am decisively against sanctions on Russia. Not only for historical 
and numerous moral reasons, but also because of a rational economic 
calculation. What would be the effect of our sanctions against a 
country like Russia? It goes without saying that in economic terms, 
this could not harm Russia. It seems to me that with such sanctions 
we would effectively impose sanctions on ourselves.
103” 
Mrkić therefore also implied that there are both moral reasons not to “turn their backs 
on their brotherly Slavic nation” as well as legitimate economic reasons. In addition, he 
claimed that even though international media reported that the EU and its officials 
pressure Serbia to join sanctions on Russia by blackmailing the country using future EU 
membership as leverage, this is not the feeling domestic actors received after meetings 
with EU officials: 
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“No meeting of our President Tomislav Nikolić with foreign officials 
has been marked by 'insistence.' […] During the visit of U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State Ms. Victoria Nuland nothing of the kind 
was demanded at all. On the contrary, full understanding was 
expressed for our friendship and our special ties with Russia. There 
has been countless speculation in the media that Federica Mogherini, 
Italy's foreign minister and current EU chair, came to 'blackmail' us, 
but nothing like that has happened.
104” 
This implies that Serbia does not intend to impose sanctions on Russia nor does it feel 
real pressure from the EU or U.S. to align.
105
 Former Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić 
(taking office in 31 May 2017 as President of Serbia) has reiterated the official stance of 
Serbia on numerous occasions and has given his insight into the numerous reasons why 
Serbia is not getting ready to nor will ever join sanctions against Russia: 
“But you're right; we did not impose any sanctions over Russia… 
because of many political, economic, historical and all the other 
reasons.
106” 
More specifically, he stated that although Serbia “supports and respects the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and Crimea as a part of Ukraine,” it is very 
dependent on Russia economically and politically and does not intend to harm itself: 
“[Serbia] is very dependent on Russia, on Russian gas, on our export 
to Russia, particularly of our agricultural products.
107” 
Serbia's exports to Russia amount to 5.4% of the country's total (main trading partners 
are Italy with 15%, Germany with 12% and Bosnia and Herzegovina with 7.7%) and its 
import share is even larger – Russia is Serbia's third largest importer with 8.7% (only 
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Germany and Italy import more to Serbia with respectively 12% and 9.7%).
108
 
Furthermore, following the sanctions regime put in place in 2014 the President of the 
Serbian Chamber of Commerce Željko Sertić advocated that the Russian-initiated ban 
on agricultural products from EU and third countries that have joined the sanctions 
regime against it would be to Serbia's advantage: 
“[Serbian exporters have room for tremendous growth] and now even 
more so when it is definitely clear that Russia will need to import 
new products to substitute the current imports.
109” 
Therefore, Serbia uses both normative and rational arguments, even though the latter 
clearly dominates the domestic discourse on sanctions against Russia. As noted, Serbia 
has a longstanding and close relationship with Russia as they are both Slavic nations, 
but it is also important to keep in mind the support Russia has offered for Serbia. 
Russia's support is most vital in relation to the status issue of Kosovo and it is 
effectively the only actor that is able to keep the dream of a united Serbia and Kosovo 
alive. Furthermore, Russia sells military equipment to Serbia as the latter is unsure of its 
ability to defend itself. This in turn is closely related with Serbia's recent history, the 
1999 NATO bombing campaign and the resulting mistrust among the citizens of Serbia 
towards the West and NATO. 
4.4.2 Montenegro 
Montenegro is currently on the path to becoming the newest NATO member as there 
was only one country left whose parliament had not yet ratified the accession approval 
needed in order to formally accept Montenegro in 2017.
110
 On 12 May, Spain's 
parliament also ratified Montenegro's NATO Accession Protocol.
111
 Further NATO 
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expansion, however, is seen by Russia as the newest provocation and move towards 
worsening relations between NATO and Russia. As a consequence, these developments 
have brought about more active Russian propaganda in Montenegro – not to mention 
accusations of Russian orchestrated coup attempt during the last general elections
112
 - 
and the Western Balkans in general in order to increase doubts about the genuine wish 
of the Western military alliance to defend small Western Balkan countries when push 
comes to show. Despite notable doubts among several opposition parties in 
Montenegro, NATO expansion is expected to take place and the government supports 
their country's membership, and this can be seen as the main objective behind 
Montenegro's foreign policy positions. 
As Montenegro has completed several reforms in order to be eligible for NATO 
membership, this is only possible if there is political support for the Western alliance 
and its decisions. The U.S. and EU have both sanctioned Russia in relation to its actions 
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and Montenegro's membership in this military alliance 
would only be possible if the country fully supports sanctions and shows willingness to 
act in solidarity with the actions and policies of EU and NATO. Understanding this, 
Montenegro has been an EU candidate state that has aligned with its CFSP 100% before 
the Ukrainian crisis and decided to join the following sanctions regime as well. This 
firm commitment to EU, the West in general and its norms and values has continued 
despite possible economic reasons to not align. 
Montenegro joined sanctions against Russia right after they were introduced in 2014 
and has been forced to defend its alignment both internationally and in response to 
domestic concerns. After Montenegro's governmental visit to the United States in April 
2014 to bid for its membership in NATO, Prime Minister Milo Đukanović was faced 
with blatant criticism from Russian authorities who were “deeply disappointed” as they 
saw PM Đukanović's statements towards Russia as “hostile”.113 The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Montenegro responded with claims that their decision to join sanctions is not 
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anti-Russian in their character, but rather a foreign policy decision that was in the 
interests of Montenegro and its citizens: 
“Everything that the prime minister stated publicly and in his talks 
with U.S. officials is in accordance with the national interests of 
Montenegro and its foreign policy orientation toward NATO and EU 
membership, and is not anti-Russian in tone.
114” 
This practical viewpoint was reinforced during the 2015 meeting between Deputy Prime 
Minister Igor Lukšić and the Russian Ambassador to Montenegro: 
“I believe that Russia understands our foreign policy objectives, 
because Montenegro’s prospective membership of the EU and NATO 
is not directed against anyone, but is intended to strengthen stability, 
security, and further development of Montenegro and the region.
115” 
Montenegro's decision to align with EU CFSP and sanctions on Russia can therefore be 
interpreted as necessary and rational when taking into account their membership bids to 
NATO and EU, but Montenegro has also officially confirmed their commitment to 
norms and values as it insists on the “appropriateness” of their foreign policy. After 
Russia added Montenegro to the list of countries whose agriculture products are banned 
from Russia for a year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to state their regret in 
relation to this decision, but confirmed that 
“harmonising with EU positions was the country's foreign policy 
priority, and that sanctions which Montenegro introduced against 
Russia at no point had an anti-Russian character, but rather came out 
of respect for the principles and values the country stands for in 
international relations.
116” 
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Montenegro's decision to join sanctions against Russia was not accepted lightly by all 
domestic parties. The main opposing side to this foreign policy position have been the 
ethnic Serb parties in Montenegro and the representatives of Serb Orthodox Church. 
Following the alignment in 2014, the PM was criticised by Metropolitan of Montenegro 
Amfilohije who described him as a traitor: 
“Đukanović is a big traitor of the historical memory of our people. 
Never in the history has the Serb people - and the Montenegrin nation 
is part of the Serb people - been against Russia. It is great treachery 
that he will answer for on Judgment Day.
117” 
Metropolitan's speech was presented in Belgrade during the promotion of Leonid 
Reshetnikov's book “To Return to Russia” as he quoted the words of Montenegro's 18th 
and 19th century ruler and military and religious leader Petar I Petrović Njegoš: 
“May he who is not loyal to the same-language, same-blood Russia, 
have the living flesh fall off him, may he be cursed thrice, and 3,000 
times by me.
118” 
Montenegro's foreign policy position and its NATO accession bid are also questioned 
by the main opposition parties which have boycotted the parliament's work since the 
October 2016 elections due to the accusation of a coup attempt by Russian nationalists. 
What is more, representatives of the opposition parties have visited several high 
officials in Moscow and supported the idea of holding an anti-constitutional referendum 
on NATO membership in Montenegro, but gave up due to lack of financial resources.
119
 
In 2017, the leader of the major ethnic Serb party Democratic Front Andrija Mandić and 
his ally Milan Knezević wrote a letter to the U.S. White House chief strategist Steve 
Bannon to ask for support in blocking NATO enlargement to Montenegro as in their 
point of view the country is not ready to join and the high popular support for NATO is 
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questionable in Montenegro.
120
 As is known, President Trump has approved 
Montenegro's membership, but Montenegro's domestic actors have still not reached a 
consensus in relation to their country's foreign policy positions and the opposition's 
boycott continues. 
During his interview for the Time magazine in February 2017, the Prime Minister for 
Montenegro further confirmed the position of Montenegro and shed light on the reasons 
why his country has opted for NATO membership even though it negatively affects 
Montenegro's relations with Russia. He also confirmed that sanctions should not be seen 
in Russia as a threat: 
“It is all about the strategic conflict between global interests, the power 
game between NATO and the West on one side and Russia on the 
other. Montenegro has cherished for more than 300 years its good 
friendship with Russia and we would never allow our territory to be 
misused in order to disrupt Russian security in any way.
121” 
Describing restrictive measures against Russia and Russian propaganda against NATO 
enlargement as “a strategic conflict between global interests” demonstrates that 
Montenegro has chosen a side in this power game, but has done so not because of the 
norms and values behind sanctions that were put in place following the annexation of 
Crimea and Russia's meddling in the internal affairs of Ukraine, but more due to its own 
strategic interests. While Montenegro is hopeful that its relations with Russia will get 
better in the future, it firmly demands that Montenegro should not be taken advantage of 
during this “power play” and ultimately, the sanctions are not against Russia, but mainly 
correspond with Montenegro's own interests: 
“It is completely wrong to interpret cooperation with someone as 
automatically meaning action against others. Montenegro and its 
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citizens have their own interests and the state leadership is working to 
implement those interests. Membership of the EU and NATO is not 
directed against Russia or anyone else, but corresponds to the needs 
of society for enduring peace and stability, a wish to essentially, and 
not only geographically, belong to the world's most developed 
countries and cherish the values of the Western civilisation.
122” 
In conclusion, Montenegro supports sanctions against Russia for both normative and 
rational reasons, but the government more often uses rational arguments in order to win 
domestic support and show that their policy is in the interests of Montenegro first and 
foremost. These rational arguments, however, are not related with the economic 
situation of Montenegro as Russia is far from being Montenegro's first trading partner 
(imports from Russia amount to 1.3% and exports less than 1%
123
), but rather with their 
security and future membership of NATO. The leaders of Montenegro have argued that 
their policies are not intended to be against Russia, but are what is needed to be done in 
order to protect national interests. Therefore, the underlying national interest for them is 
membership in EU and NATO for which they are willing to set other interests aside. 
4.4.3 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Macedonia places future membership in NATO as first and commencement of 
negotiations for EU membership as second on its list of government's priorities.
124
 
However, as noted in a previous subchapter, the country's alignment with EU CFSP 
declarations, positions and Council decisions has been decreasing as it went from 94% 
in 2013 to 73% in 2014 and has more or less stayed on that level since then. FYROM's 
National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) from 2016 indicates that 
currently it regularly aligns with EU policies and it will continue to do so: 
“The Republic of Macedonia regularly joins the declarations, 
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statements and decisions of the EU, with which restrictive measures 
and sanctions against countries, entities and individuals are being 
imposed.
125” 
This statement of course is not wrong and the FYROM indeed does align with certain 
EU sanctions, but has done so generally in relation to countries that they have 
superficial or no relations with. What concerns the country's trade relations with Russia, 
there is little to confirm that Macedonia would not impose sanctions due to its large 
scale import and export relations with Moscow. In 2015, the main export destinations 
for Macedonia were Germany (38%), Serbia (6.9%), Bulgaria (5.5%), the Czech 
Republic (4.3%) and Greece (4.3%).
126
 Exports to Russia amounted to only 1% of 
FYROM's total exports. Same goes for imports which mostly came from Germany 
(13%), the United Kingdom (11%), Serbia (7.9%) and Greece (7.7%) while Russia's 
imports only amounted to 2.1% of total imports. This would imply that FYROM does 
not have a lot to lose trade-wise if it would put sanctions in place on Russia, but 
economic relations cannot be seen as the main driver for decision-making in the 
Western Balkans. 
While analysing government press releases and news reports on the possible joining 
with EU sanctions against Russia, the thesis concludes that the leaders of Macedonia are 
unusually silent as there are limited to no English-language press releases or speeches 
intended for international audiences on government websites that would draw attention 
to the conflict in Ukraine, condemn related violence or insist that action should be taken 
in response to annexation of Crimea. The lack of attention given to the crisis in Ukraine 
is notable as it visibly differs from other countries in the region, as even those that have 
also not joined sanctions are still actively taking part in the discussion. This could be 
interpreted in many ways as FYROM has chosen to pursue EU and NATO membership 
and officially praises the values that these organisations carry. During a NATO day 
event organised by the Euro-Atlantic Council of Macedonia in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Defence and NATO contact embassies in Macedonia, Defence Minister 
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Zoran Jolevski noted that integration is a top priority for his country due to the values it 
protects: 
“NATO membership guarantees the prosperity and security not only 
of Macedonia, but also of the countries in the region and beyond, and 
as a result the Alliance must resume its open-door policy [...] 
Nowadays, NATO is considered a crucial alliance in maintaining 
global peace, improving relations between nations, preventing wars 
and advancing human rights and overall progress of the countries.
127” 
Public support for NATO membership is very high in Macedonia – some polls have 
even shown that 90% of the people of Macedonia supported NATO membership some 
years ago.
128
 This support, however, has decreased as in 2016 only about 73% endorsed 
Macedonia's possible future membership. These numbers indicate that foreign policy 
discourse in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been closely related with 
possible NATO membership, but there is little discussion on the foreign policy of the 
EU and its sanctions on Russia. In general, however, there is little difference between 
the values that these two organisations promote and therefore, publicly supporting the 
policies of both organisations should be equally acceptable to FYROM. 
Macedonia's lowering support for NATO membership and their frustration with EU's 
decision to postpone their opening negotiations with the EU are closely related with a 
bilateral issue FYROM has with Greece. Even though the European Commission 
recommended already in 2009 to start negotiations with FYROM, Greece has blocked it 
the same way it has blocked the country's membership in NATO.
129
 What has resulted is 
a deep frustration in Macedonia with their overall progress in the accession process that 
has offered no guarantees that they can ever become members if they do not solve the 
issue of FYROM's name in cooperation with Greece. In 2012, Greece was joined by 
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Bulgaria in blocking the start of the accession negotiations with FYROM on the 
grounds that the latter “had failed to nurture good neighbourly relations.”130 
During an interview for the Austrian Die Press, Foreign Minister Nikola Poposki said 
that the European Union made a mistake in 2009 by allowing Greece to veto opening of 
negotiations with Macedonia as the reform process in his country has suffered because 
of it: 
“Now we have received the eighth EC recommendation to open 
accession negotiations. We received the first EC recommendation in 
2009. European Council then made big mistake by not accepting the 
recommendation. And Greece sought postponement of the start of 
accession negotiations [...] the greatest progress was achieved during 
the negotiations for EU membership. Therefore, the biggest mistake 
was postponement of the start of accession negotiations with 
Macedonia for 8 years.
131” 
Discussions on future progress in integrating the country have largely been put on hold 
due to the name issue of FYROM and resulting from this, many policy areas receive 
little attention, including the CFSP alignment of Macedonia. Today, Macedonia is 
facing a government crisis as both influential political parties received the backing of a 
similar amount of Macedonian voters and are unable to agree on who should be the 
future prime minister and who forms the government. As a result, Macedonia is now 
believed to be much further away from opening negotiations as it had been several years 
before when the European Commission recommended starting the negotiations, but one 
EU member state blocked it due to bilateral disputes. 
While high officials of Macedonia generally avoid discussing EU sanctions on Russia, 
Moscow has used its fair share of opportunities to draw parallels and interpret the 
situation in Macedonia from their point of view. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov indicated that he believes the current problems in Macedonia are the result of 
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Western powers trying to meddle in the affairs of third states by provoking colour 
revolutions and supporting opposition parties in order to produce a government that 
would align with EU's policies: 
“Developments in Macedonia are result of the desire to influence the 
Government of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski regarding his refusal 
to join the sanctions against Russia.
132” 
In addition, it is claimed that after former PM Gruevski lost the support of the EU 
following his wiretapping scandal, there are no alternative choices for him to stay in 
power than to accept support from Russia.
133
 This viewpoint was introduced after the 
2015 anti-government protests in Skopje when the leader of the opposition, Zoran Zaev 
demanded that the current Prime Minister Nikola Gruevki steps down from office due to 
his alleged abuse of power. As Russian FM Lavrov explained it: 
“Gruevski was under fire because he has refused to support the EU’s 
sanctions against Russia over its involvement in Ukraine... Support 
for a pipeline delivering Russian gas to Europe via Turkey, which is 
competing with an EU-supported project for Azeri gas, is also a 
factor.
134” 
On its part, the Foreign Minister of Macedonia Nikola Poposki noted already in 2012 
that Macedonia has a special relationship with Russia, and this has not changed 
following the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea: 
“Moreover, it has been announced that Macedonia will be part of 
strategic gas pipeline project 'South Stream', which is expected to 
contribute to the development of numerous industrial branches and 
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energy in general.
135” 
In conclusion, there is little debate in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
concerning the sanctions against Russia and whether Macedonia should join them. If 
taking into account trade relations between Macedonia and Russia, sanctions would 
have caused little to no problems for Macedonia, but since there is no reason to join 
sanctions as the country would not be any closer to EU and/or NATO membership 
anyway, the government of FYROM has chosen to non-align with EU CFSP in this 
matter. What is more, Macedonian exports to Russia have risen as countries who have 
not sanctioned Russia are taking the place of other EU states and the U.S. that have.
136
 
Therefore, the decision concerning whether to join EU sanctions against Russia is made 
based on a cost-benefit calculation whereby Macedonia might benefit from increased 
trade relations and the Turkish Stream project,
137
 but will not gain anything from 
aligning as Greece will continue blocking its accession to both organisations until they 
solve the name dispute. 
4.4.4 Albania 
Albania joined restrictive measures against Russia in 2014 and therefore has had a 
100% alignment with EU CFSP both before and after the Ukrainian crisis. Furthermore, 
as Albania has been a member of NATO since 2009, its foreign policy is in line with the 
general positions of the West, including both EU and NATO. Although press releases 
and news articles about Albanian alignment with EU foreign policy are rather 
infrequent, there is reason to trust that joining restrictive measures was not a policy 
position up for debate in this Western Balkan country. On its part, Russia has 
introduced counter-sanctions against both Albania and Montenegro, but has not been 
very vocal about the Albanian government's decision to align with the EU in this matter 
nor has it questioned popular support to it. Albania and Russia have not had very close 
relations in comparison with many other Western Balkan countries and as a result there 
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is little to suggest Albania could have seriously calculated whether to ruin relations with 
“a brotherly nation” or stand firmly behind NATO and the West which effectively 
ensure its security. Foreign Minister Ditmir Bushati sees Albania as “the most 
developed democracy in the Western Balkans” and “a bastion against Russia's influence 
in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Croatia.
138” 
When analysing statements after various visits by EU high officials to Albania and also 
Albanian ministers abroad, its 100% alignment record is regularly mentioned and 
Albania is praised for its commitment to promoting EU values. During the December 
2014 meeting of Foreign Minister Ditmir Bushati and High Representative Federica 
Mogherini in Brussels, the minister reported afterwards that 
“geopolitical clarity is key, if we want to build a state of common 
purpose and common values in the Western Balkans. As the High 
Representative noted, Albania is proud of its record of full alignment 
with EU foreign policy.
139” 
In addition, during an open lecture in the Tirana University's Faculty of Social Sciences, 
Minister Bushati focused on Euro-Atlantic cooperation and shared values as he 
explained the origins of Albania's foreign policy. The main policy positions of his 
country, he claims are based on the democratisation and transformation of Albanian 
society: 
“Based on our years of experience as NATO members, I can tell you 
that the participation in the Alliance has transformed Albania into a 
country, which generates and should radiate stability. Meanwhile, the 
process of EU membership is a national objective, in view of the 
democratisation and transformation of the Albanian society, in 
accordance with the values and principles of the united Europe. An 
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essential element in this regard is the fact that during these past two 
years, we have remained consistent in the 100% alignment of our 
views with those of the European Union.
140” 
Furthermore, in his speech he quoted Ismail Kadare, an Albanian novelist and poet, as 
he indicated his full support to this understanding. He declared that Albanian foreign 
policy is oriented towards the promotion of peace, security and prosperity, above all in 
our region and therefore, “Europe is the natural condition of Albania. The only one.141” 
When analysing Albania's seemingly unconditional support to EU CFSP and sanctions 
against Russia which seem to be based on the norms and values Albania upholds, it 
needs to be taken into account that there might also be more rational explanations to 
these policy choices. The most obvious one is Albania's deep and brotherly relationship 
with neighbouring Kosovo where the majority of the population consist of Albanians 
and which unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008 and relies on the 
West to guarantee the continuation of its statehood. Furthermore, as Albania and Russia 
have organised intergovernmental committees to advance trade and economic 
cooperation, it can be argued that rational interest to strengthen bilateral ties is not out 
of the picture, at least as an official position.
142
 
4.4.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The decision-making to align with CFSP is particularly difficult in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina due to its tripartite Presidency where three ethnic representatives all have 
an equal say in the foreign affairs of the country. As all three presidency members – a 
Bosnik, a Serb and a Croat are effectively able to block any decision they might expect 
to be against their interest, it is not surprising that Bosnia and Herzegovina has not 
joined EU sanctions regime against Russia. Therefore, even though the potential 
candidate country has managed to agree aligning with 77% of EU CFSP positions, 
declarations and Council decisions, sanctions are firmly blocked by the Serb entity 
                                                 
140
 'Open lecture of Minister Bushati at the Faculty of Social Sciences: 'Does Albania have a foreign 
policy?'', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, 28 October 2015 
<http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en/press-office/speeches/open-lecture-of-minister-bushati-at-the-
faculty-of-social-sciences-does-albania-have-a-foreign-policy&page=5> [accessed 22 April 2017] 
141
 Ibid. 
142
 'Albania, Russia seek to boost sanctions-hit trade, investment ties', Tirana Times, 5 April 2017 
<http://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=131870> [accessed 22 April 2017] 
65 
 
Republika Srpska, led by President Milorad Dodik. The President of Republika Srpska, 
on his part, has been committed to not aligning with EU sanctions against Russia in 
order to maintain his entity's good relations with Moscow: 
“I do not intend to deal with the topic of Crimea, because it does not 
concern me.
143” 
After the annexation of Crimea, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the “Declaration on 
the political situation in Ukraine” which did not include any kind of condemnation of 
Russia's involvement in destabilising eastern Ukraine nor the annexation of Crimea, but 
only general calls for a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian crisis.
144
 Furthermore, the 
Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mirsada Čolaković left the room when the 
United Nations started its vote on the referendum in Crimea in March 2014.
145
 
The conflicting understanding about the country's future and relations with other states 
is also evident from the general directions and principles of implementing foreign 
policy of their tripartite presidency country as these do not include any specific 
alignments plans related to the EU. The foreign policy agenda does not declare the EU 
membership as a goal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but rather sees the integration 
process as a tool to reform the country and create links with other European nations: 
“Bosnia and Herzegovina foreign policy has been aimed at promoting 
and preserving the lasting peace, security and stable democratic and 
the entire development in the country, in other words, at the accession 
into contemporary European, political, economic and security 
integration flows.
146” 
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In 2016 Milorad Dodik held an anti-constitutional referendum in Republika Srpska (RS) 
on celebrating the National Day of RS which marks the day of their entity's declaration 
of independence in 9 January 1992. This prompted strong criticism from the West due 
to the divisive nature of the referendum. Following these developments, the U.S. 
imposed sanctions on Milorad Dodik which it explained were put in place due to 
Dodik's complete ignorance of the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the bloody war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
147
 On his part, Dodik has also called for the creation of 
Greater Serbia: “There is a wonderful idea ... and that is to separate RS [from Bosnia] 
and to form a union with Serbia and that is together with four municipalities of 
Kosovo
148” and insists that Western sanctions against Russia are unjust as he hopes 
Russia might supports its bid for independence in the future: 
“..injustice of Western sanctions against Russia and the fact that the 
RS in the BiH institutions did not gave a consent to such an act.
149” 
 As Bosnia and Herzegovina is run by a tripartite presidency that decides all foreign 
policy matters together, whereas each member of the presidency has a veto, it is not 
surprising that the country does not align with EU sanctions against Russia. Following 
statements from Bosniak and Croat representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the second powerful entity, it is clear that overall the foreign policy 
objective is to join the EU in the future and although Milorad Dodik has not completely 
excluded the possibility of membership, it is highly unlikely that he would agree to 
align with EU CFSP in order to progress in the accession talks with EU. Former Foreign 
Minister Dr. Zlatko Lagumdzija, however, has confirmed that integration of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina should conclude with membership in both organisations not only due to 
security and economic concerns, but the values these organisations uphold: 
“Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot remain unfinished story of the 
European Union and NATO and integration process of our country 
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and the entire region must be implemented project in sense of full 
implementation of European values where our thoughts about 
European values will become our words and our actions.
150” 
He has also confirmed that even though European values are currently not a reality in 
his country, every effort should be taken to make them a reality in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
151
 Ignorance of some actors in the country towards the Ukrainian crisis 
and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 is also displayed though increased trade with 
Russia, despite EU's insistence that the future candidate state should not take advantage 
of the situation.
152
 Trade relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Russia are not 
overly significant as the major trading partners are still Serbia and the EU countries (e.g. 
Germany, Italy, Austria, Croatia and Slovenia) as only 4.9% of overall imports come 
from Russia and 1.2% of exports go to Russia.
153
 When comparing the trading partners 
of each entity, however, it is clear that Russia as a trading partner is more important for 
Republika Srpska than for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia's value 
concerning trade numbers has even increased after sanctions were put in place as RS has 
ignored the demands from the EU that this situation should not be taken advantage of 
trade-wise. The food producers are keen to use sanctions to their advantage and the 
presidency of RS does not object to it: 
“These sanctions were welcomed very much. Thanks to some other 
problems in Europe, we have been fortunate enough and able to use 
the opportunity and rapidly orient ourselves towards this market and 
win it.
154” 
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Similarly to other countries in the region, there is very little attention given to values 
and norms that the EU CFSP is based on, at least in RS. Decisions are taken in order to 
advance own interests and keep different lines of communication open in order to 
ensure governance is possible, progress in other areas of EU integration is not blocked 
and what is most important for the President of Republika Srpska, that all options for 
future statehood are kept alive. 
4.4.6 Kosovo 
Considering the status issue of Kosovo and its difficult relations with Serbia and Russia, 
it is not surprising that in March 2014, its foreign ministry officially and clearly 
condemned the aggression in Ukraine by openly condemning the actions of Russia 
which Kosovo sees a threat to peace and security not only in Ukraine, but also in the 
wider region: 
“The Republic of Kosovo condemns aggression on the territory of 
Ukraine from the Russian Federation, and the violation of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine in violation of the 
Russian Federation obligations, under the UN Charter, of the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Memorandum of Budapest, 1994. Actions taken by 
the Russian Federation are a threat to peace and security of Ukraine 
and the wider region. Republic of Kosovo calls on all parties to 
respect international promises and resolve any concerns about 
security through dialogue and international mediation respecting the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.
155” 
What is more, not only did Kosovo condemn the violence perpetrated in Ukraine, it 
joined sanctions against Russia on September 17, 2014. This decision was made in 
order to clearly show the West that Kosovo supports the EU and U.S., shares the values 
they aim to protect in the world and hopes to become a part of the European Union in 
the future. The former Foreign Minister of Kosovo Enver Hoxhaj noted during his 
meeting with the Head of the European Delegation to Kosovo Samuel Žbogar that 
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Kosovo is ready to continue its support to international partners in all activities that aim 
stability and world peace by emphasising that 
“Recent commitments undertaken by the Government of Kosovo 
regarding the sanctions against Russia […] are proofs of a proactive 
and dynamic approach of Kosovo's foreign policy.
156” 
During a summit of the foreign and defence ministers of the Baltic and Western Balkan 
states which was held in Lithuania in 2014, minister Hoxhaj confirmed that he hopes 
Kosovo is able to move forward in its accession process towards NATO as well as 
emphasised the difficult security situation in Europe after the annexation of Crimea by 
Russia. In relation to this event, the press release by the Foreign Ministry of Kosovo 
stated: 
“Regarding the current security concerns in Europe, Minister Hoxhaj 
emphasised that after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Europe is 
no longer as safe as it was intended, calling this step of Russia as one 
of the most dangerous acts after the Cold War. Russian annexation of 
the territory of Ukraine, according to him, constitutes a threat to 
stability and peace in Europe and the challenge for democratisation 
efforts of the EU and NATO.
157” 
These statements carry a strong commitment to EU norms and values, but on Kosovo's 
part it is also rational to support the EU and U.S. in relation to their foreign policy 
positions as they guarantee the continuation of the country's unilaterally declared 
independence from the year 2008 and its security in the region. 
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5. Comparison 
Reasons for alignment or non-alignment with European Union Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in the Western Balkan countries have similarities, but it is also possible 
to highlight many differences. In general, the foreign policy agenda of all countries 
researched in this Master's thesis is future EU membership, but several states have 
competing national interests that strongly clash with the conditions set forth by the 
European Union. Furthermore, it can be noted that the researched states more often use 
rational rather than normative arguments in order to explain their alignment record. As a 
result, it is questionable whether these states are ready to defend EU values abroad 
when only half of the current enlargement countries align with EU foreign policy 
themselves. 
When analysing the perceived legitimacy of EU accession conditions it was expected 
that non-aligning countries have a clear understanding that they would be able to 
become future member states only by fulfilling certain conditions. In order to draw 
conclusions about the perceived legitimacy of EU demands, the speeches and press 
releases of EU high officials were analysed in order to determine whether or not public 
pressure was applied by the EU. It can be concluded that despite progressive alignment 
being part of the conditions that allow candidate states to move forward in the accession 
progress, it is notable that media generally reports that EU officials claim that they 
understand the reasoning behind non-alignment of certain states and therefore, do not 
push for alignment at any cost - at least not before the very end of the accession process. 
Furthermore, it seems to be acceptable that alignment in foreign policy matters takes 
time and/or candidates are not able to align due to their close relations with Russia. 
Resulting from this weak public pressure from the EU, various ministers and other 
politicians from enlargement states report that they will not align or will align in due 
course, but are not going to change their policy in the near future. 
The countries which do not align with CFSP in relation to sanctions introduced against 
Russia are Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Among these, Serbia is the most vocal about EU sanctions against Russia 
and has repeatedly confirmed that they do not currently plan to nor will ever align with 
EU foreign policy in this matter. As Serbia's non-alignment with CFSP is closely related 
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with the status issue of Kosovo, some government members have even publicly 
announced that if the EU would pressure them into aligning, they would probably 
accept that they are not able to become member states at all. Therefore, for Serbia the 
conditions concerning Chapter 31 of the accession criteria are not legitimate and it is 
likely that perhaps Serbia would be more interested in changing EU conditions in this 
matter or wait for the Ukrainian crisis resolves rather than align with policies they do 
not agree with. 
The other non-aligning states, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FYROM are generally 
less vocal in this matter, but for these countries the possibility of becoming member 
states in the near future is even more questionable. As Bosnia and Herzegovina is not 
even an official candidate state and is not able to align due to the firm opposition of the 
President of one of their entities, Republika Srpska, there is little hope that the country 
would join sanctions against Russia. What concerns Macedonia, it needs to be noted 
that its path to EU membership has been blocked by Greece since 2009 and resulting 
from this, the name issue of the country has become the most important obstacle in their 
accession process. Therefore, it is not possible to confirm that the legitimacy of EU 
condition concerning progressive alignment with EU CFSP is high or low because 
foreign policy alignment gets little attention from their respective governments due to 
other more pressing limitations in their accession process which they need to address 
first. 
What concerns the Western Balkan countries that align with CFSP and sanctions against 
Russia, the EU is very vocal in praising their solidarity. For these three countries, 
alignment with sanctions is important as their track record is often pointed out by EU 
officials and alignment positively sets them apart from other countries in the region. 
While in the case of Montenegro, there is increased pressure and criticism from Russia 
in relation to their sanctions policy, in Albania and Kosovo there is little discussion 
about the necessity of maintaining this policy as they do not have friendly or very 
beneficial bilateral relations with Russia. Overall, EU conditions concerning foreign 
policy are legitimate in these three countries and they understand the benefit this brings 
to their overall integration perspective. What concerns Montenegro, however, there are 
many domestic actors who actively seek to discredit this foreign policy agenda and 
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therefore, the EU should continue explaining the links between values and its foreign 
policy. 
The second and third hypotheses argued that aligning countries are more likely to use 
normative arguments and non-aligning countries are more likely to use rational 
arguments when explaining their alignment record to the EU. Empirical analysis of the 
official positions of Western Balkan states shows that this is not the case most of the 
time. While non-aligning countries mainly use rational explanations for their track 
records, there are also examples of countries that use normative arguments, or both, but 
the norms generally referred to are not EU norms. In the case of Serbia, its cultural link 
as a Slavic nation and close historical cooperation with Russia is very important. Even 
though Russia might not be their main trading partner, there is an agreement among 
different actors in Serbian society that close cooperation with Russia is both necessary 
and moral. Furthermore, there are many references to past relations of Serbia and the 
West which have resulted in deep mistrust in EU's objectives in foreign policy matters 
among the Serbian people and some government members. 
While Montenegro would seem be the most obvious case to confirm the hypothesis that 
aligning countries are more likely to use normative arguments, there is little to confirm 
this. In an extensive amount of news articles, speeches and press releases, the focus is 
more on the national interest of Montenegro and their rational calculation than on EU 
norms and values. Furthermore, when criticised by Russia for their alignment with 
CFSP, Montenegro has generally argued that they have nothing against Russia, but they 
did not have any other option than to align as they would not be able to join NATO if 
they did not show commitment to Western values. It must be said, however, that EU 
norms and values also seem to be respected and therefore discussed in a notable amount 
of occasions and in several documents. Overall, Montenegro's main talking points are 
focused on the rational interests of the country rather than the normative aspect of its 
foreign policy agenda. 
All in all, there are two countries in the Western Balkans where the focus on norms and 
values is dominant in the discourse on CFSP and Western sanctions against Russia. 
These countries are Albania, which is a member state of NATO since 2009 and Kosovo. 
Due to its status issue and the Western support that has allowed Kosovo to declare and 
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defend its sovereignty, it remains firmly committed to the EU and NATO. In Albania 
and Kosovo, the question of whether or not to join sanctions against Russia does not 
seem to be difficult as both countries have condemned Russia's actions in Ukraine and 
the annexation of Crimea. Furthermore, their relation with Russia is superficial (e.g. 
Russia's trade share in their economies is next to nothing). Therefore, the focus is more 
on values like stability, prosperity, integrity and territorial sovereignty. Kosovo, on its 
part, is the most critical of Russia's actions in Ukraine and has issued statements by their 
government that confirm their commitment to EU values and strong position towards 
Russia and the Ukrainian crisis. 
As was noted, Western sanctions against Russia are barely discussed in the local news 
of FYROM and this could be interpreted in many ways. What is interesting about 
Macedonia, however, is that even though their government does not focus much on the 
option to join sanctions, Russia's government is more vocal when it comes to 
Macedonia. As the position of FYROM's government is not clearly stated in domestic 
media, it is not possible to conclude their main arguments in this matter, but it is 
important to note that in recent years the government has started working more closely 
with their Russian counterparts in several issues concerning their economies and 
cooperation in the field of energetics. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
government is much more interested in economic benefits than on upholding and 
publicly advocating for EU norms and values despite these being included in their 
official foreign policy agenda. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a distinct case as it seems the governments of the two 
entities have developed exactly the opposite positions in this matter. While the President 
of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina publicly speaks about joining EU as soon 
as possible and reaffirms the necessity to respect and support the EU also in foreign 
policy and norms protection, the President of the Republika Srpska does not agree. The 
latter is recorded as openly declaring that Western sanctions are unjust and therefore, his 
country would never align with this policy. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or 
parts of it, have taken advantage of the sanctions regime in order to increase their own 
trade and level of cooperation with Russia. 
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When comparing the ethnic compositions of these countries, it can be noted that there 
are three countries that are mostly populated by one major ethnic group – Serbia, 
Albania and Kosovo (not including northern Kosovo which is populated by Serbs and 
lacks power to influence the decision of the central government). Based on the empirical 
data used in this thesis, it can be noted that these three countries are also the ones which 
do not have any large-scale debate in their respective societies about whether to change 
their foreign policy agendas. Serbia is firmly committed to not supporting the sanctions 
regime and in contrast, Albania and Kosovo are not actively discussing whether 
sanctions should be dropped on their parts. Therefore, there is little hope for a policy 
change in the near future. 
As expected, countries with more than one major ethnic group are more or less split 
when it comes to the national foreign policy agenda as a variety of opinions is not 
uncommon. In Montenegro, CFSP alignment continues to be 100%, but this does not 
mean that all groups in the society are supportive of the government in this decision. 
This thesis argues the opposite – there is an extensive debate going on in the society 
about possible NATO membership and sanctions on Russia, but even the boycott by the 
opposition has not changed the government's official position as the opposition lacks 
power and resources to influence the agenda more effectively. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the situation is more or less the same when it comes to competing 
opinions, but the difference lies in the state structure which allows all parties to veto any 
policy they see as against national interest or the interest of their specific ethnic group. 
All in all, CFSP alignment is an important issue the Western Balkan states need to 
address in the future and the EU should ensure that enlargement countries understand 
that commitment to its norms is non-negotiable. When comparing this enlargement 
round with the two previous ones in 2007 and 2013, we can observe that Croatia, 
Bulgaria and Romania were all aligning with the EU CFSP long before their 
accession
158
, but it has to be noted of course that they did not have to put sanctions in 
place against a possible major cultural or trading partner. However, in 2017, all these 
newest member states are committed to supporting common EU policy in this matter. 
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 Đukanović, p. 87 
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Conclusion 
The Western Balkan enlargement has been an objective for both the European Union as 
well as for the potential and official candidate states themselves. This has been 
confirmed in multiple declarations and statements and by the continuous work done by 
all parties. While further enlargement might not take place in the near future and 
candidates will not probably join all at once like the CEE countries did, the long-term 
goals are clear. Furthermore, as the domestic politics in the Western Balkan countries 
have become more unstable in the last few years, attention from the EU is becoming 
more and more vital each year as integration into the Western values space could 
potentially stabilise these societies. 
Keeping these objectives in mind, the European Union needs to further emphasise that 
the accession conditions are not negotiable and that all acquis and policy positions need 
to be adopted in order to ensure the union will remain an actor that is able to “speak in a 
single voice” and achieve its goals both in the region as well as in the world. Norms and 
values are an important part of EU CFSP as the EU is founded upon these values and 
they form the basis of its foreign policy positions and instruments. Therefore, the need 
to ensure full alignment is necessary for both the enlargement countries to keep their 
membership perspective alive and for the EU to remain a legitimate actor that protects 
these norms by setting an example for third countries. 
The aim of this Master's thesis was to shed light on the difficulties the EU and its 
candidate countries have in reaching a consensus on what should be the aim and 
instruments of EU foreign policy. While for the EU it is important that all members and 
possible members align with its policies and help to promote norms outside the union, it 
has proven somewhat difficult for half of the potential and official candidate states to 
progressively align with EU acquis in this field. There are numerous reasons for this 
and each country researched in this Master's thesis has a specific historical background 
that has resulted in obtaining a specific perspective on foreign policy issues, but the 
overall purpose was to analyse whether the reasons for aligning or non-aligning have 
rational or normative explanations. While normative understanding of the necessity to 
align would be preferred by the union, there is little to confirm that the EU and the 
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enlargement countries focus on the deeply rooted reasons for putting sanctions in place 
against Russia, following the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea. 
Research shows that out of six current enlargement countries only two align with 
sanctions policy in relation to Russia due to their internalisation of EU norms and 
values. While Montenegro could also be considered a country that upholds these norms, 
the general discourse of their government focuses more on rational explanations and the 
national interest of the state and its citizens. The remaining three countries have either 
avoided discussing these sanctions, have voiced their complete opposition to them or 
are blocked by domestic opposition. As foreign policy positions and decisions are taken 
by consensus in the EU, it is clear that further enlargement to some of these Western 
Balkan states could result in member state veto on important decisions in the future. 
Therefore, the EU could only adopt positions that are not controversial or that would not 
be contrary to the interest of even one member state. 
While the ethnic composition of the current enlargement countries is an important factor 
for reaching a domestic consensus, it does not mean that states with one major ethnic 
group are more likely to align with EU policies. Serbia has proven the opposite as their 
population is firmly against sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, while its government 
supports EU membership, public opinion polls show that Serbian people have not 
internalised this goal and are not ready to reconsider their cultural relations as a Slavic 
nation in order to join the EU no matter what. In addition, in Serbia's neighbouring 
states with a clear Slavic minority, there is also strong opposition to sanctions on Russia 
which has resulted in non-alignment in Bosnia and Herzegovina and vocal opposition to 
sanctions and NATO membership in Montenegro. It can be concluded, therefore, that 
some parts of the EU CFSP are not only against the rational interest of these states, but 
are out of sync with the values currently upheld in those societies or among certain 
ethnic groups. As their populations have not generally agreed upon the norms which 
should be seen as appropriate, the continuous debate might result in policy shifts in 
Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The end goal of the EU should be that the Western norms and values are deeply rooted 
in these societies. This is needed since it is only then that people in these countries 
would understand that certain decisions might not be in their interests in the short term 
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perspective, but are important for the continued role the EU plays in the world as a 
normative power. Since politicians are not independent from their voters and they 
generally act in accordance with the popular opinion, it is needed that these norms are 
internalised on the individual level. As noted in the theory chapter, change in policy 
positions can be achieved through having domestic actors that have an alternative 
understanding and a possibility to voice their opinion. These opposing sides exist in 
certain WB states and therefore the top-down pressure from the EU which has currently 
resulted in a deadlock should focus on giving a voice to domestic players in non-
aligning states who could influence their governments' decision-making or at least 
trigger a debate in these societies. 
Further research on enlargement policy, the Western Balkans and the process of norm 
transfer in the region is needed in order to analyse the role the European Union has 
played in the socialisation of these countries and promoting its values among their 
populations. Although this thesis focused on analysing both the top-down pressure by 
the EU as well as bottom-up response from the representatives of governments, it could 
prove useful to study the internal developments and alternative views of non-
governmental actors more in depth. Furthermore, while it was not possible to include 
many foreign language news and statements in this thesis, it would certainly 
complement this analysis if this type of data was also included. 
All in all, as the ethnic divisions in a society are just one possible way how to 
differentiate the various domestic positions on a policy field, it is by no means the only 
option. Deeper and more-broad based knowledge of the region and their reasoning 
behind alignment choices is needed in order to draw more elaborated conclusions on 
this subject in the future. If the EU would continue its current discourse on CFSP that 
does not seem to have an effect on the foreign policy positions nor the values of some of 
these countries, the latter would likely remain hesitant to choose between the West and 
Russia, and their foreign policy positions might not be suitable for membership in the 
European Union whose aim is to promote its values and norms in the region. 
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